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This paper uses two recently completed surveys 
of individual entrepreneurs (farmers and 
microentrepreneurs) and registered enterprises 
(agricultural and nonagricultural) operating in Mexico’s 
rural sector to provide new evidence about the factors 
influencing the incidence of credit constraints and 
investment behavior. To measure the incidence of credit 
constraints, the authors use self-reported information 
on whether economic agents have a demand for loans, 
separating formal and informal markets. They define 
credit constraints as a situation where rural agents report 
an unsatisfied demand for loans (formal or informal), 
which originates from rural agents having projects 
that are too risky or from impediments hindering the 
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ability of rural agents and lenders to reduce information 
asymmetries. The authors find that the self-reported 
demand for loans is low. Nevertheless, the incidence 
of credit constraints is pervasive, especially among 
individual entrepreneurs. The low use of loans has 
consequences for the amount of investments that occur 
in the rural economy, posing a major obstacle to Mexico’s 
convergence towards its NAFTA partners. The empirical 
analysis, which includes proxies of business prospects and 
creditworthiness, shows that improving the availability 
of loans to credit constrained agents would increase 
the number of agents making investments and their 
investment to capital ratios. 
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1.  Introduction 
Are rural economic agents credit constrained?
 This question is of interest not only to researchers but also 
to public officials whose policies influence the availability of funds in rural loan markets. Without access 
to external finance, entrepreneurs and enterprises cannot realize their full growth potential, resulting in 
slower economic growth for a country as a whole. Inability to obtain sufficient funds, or, in other words, 
credit constraints, is often cited as one of the main factors limiting firms’ operations and growth, 
especially so in countries with weak financial markets and institutions. In the case of Mexico, Chapter 2 
shows that individual entrepreneurs and enterprises mention lack of credit as a constraint to their 
operations. The data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) illustrate the issue of access 
to financial services from the enterprise’ perspective.
1  Such data show that Mexican firms rate financing 
as more of an operational and growth constraint than for their counterparts in other Latin American 
countries. Moreover, they rate access to long-term loans, access to export finance, paperwork, and 
corruption of bank officials as greater obstacles than for enterprises in the Latin American region.
2 
In the economic literature credit constraints (or credit rationing) are defined as a situation in which 
interest rates do not fully adjust to equalize the demand and supply of loans. Some borrowers are denied 
credit even though they are willing to pay market interest rates (or more), whereas apparently similar 
borrowers are able to obtain credit (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1981). The borrowers who are denied credit (either 
fully or partially) are referred to as credit constrained. Thus, credit constraints arise as a response to 
asymmetric information problems that characterize loan contracts. On one side, the willingness of the 
borrower to accept higher interest rate signals their higher risk (and therefore higher probability of 
default), which leads to lender’s unwillingness to lend to these customers because of the perceived 
adverse selection effect. On the other side, obtaining a higher interest loan may decrease repayment 
incentives of the borrower and may induce them to take up riskier projects (the moral hazard effect). Both 
of these situations result in a case of credit constraint (that is, when interest rates do not adjust and there is 
an excess demand for loans). To solve the asymmetric information problem, lenders resort to different 
mechanisms to screen, monitor, and enforce credit contracts, such as collateral requirements, gathering of 
information, or monitoring activities. Less developed countries with poor financial sector infrastructure 
(such as poor credit information registries, poor collateral laws, and so forth) may see a stronger incidence 
of credit constraints.  
Do credit constraints affect investment behavior? The linkage between investment behavior and credit 
constraints receives substantial attention among researchers and policymakers. By having a negative 
effect on the investment behavior of economic agents, credit constraints can influence firms’ growth 
potential, especially among small firms.
3 At the firm level, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) 
calculated the proportion of firms growing faster than if using only internally generated funds. They find 
                                                      
1  Please note that the WBES is the first effort to collect consistent cross-country survey data from a representative sample of 
firms in the manufacturing, service, and other sectors. However, this survey is very restricted in the number of firms for each 
country, and thus its findings should be interpreted as anecdotic evidence.  
2 See the WBES interactive dataset for individual questions for Mexico and other countries at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/index1.html. 
3 Extensive literature exists on the linkage between aggregate investment and economic growth at the macro level. This 
discussion is omitted here because our main interest is at firm or household level.  See for example Levine (1997), Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), and Beck and others (2000).   3 
 
that this proportion is positively related to financial development and to legal system indicators, 
suggesting that access to finance at the firm level increases their growth. More recently, Beck and others 
(2002) used WBES survey data to study the effect of financing constraints on growth using subjective 
evaluations of entrepreneurs of the financing and legal constraints they face. They find that firms 
reporting higher financial and legal constraints and corruption grow more slowly, and this effect is 
especially strong for small firms. 
Mexico is an important case to study the issues mentioned above. It not only lags behind comparable 
countries in terms of domestic financial development, but also presents a sustained contraction of 
domestic financial depth as measured by credit- and liabilities-side indicators of financial depth. Bank 
deposits to GDP in the country declined from 25 percent in 1997 to 17 percent in 2002. Similarly, over 
this period, M2 to GDP fell from 28 percent to 22 percent. Overall, credit to the private sector, including 
lending by private and development banks, nonbanks, and foreign sources, declined from 43 percent to 40 
percent, attributed to a contraction of bank lending.
4 Private bank lending to the private sector fell from a 
peak equivalent of 16 percent of GDP to 9 percent.
5 Development banks also decreased their lending from 
3.4 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent. Until the Tequila crisis in 1995, banks had been the main source of 
credit to the private sector in Mexico. Since then, nonbank and foreign financing have kept pace with 
GDP growth, providing an alternative source of financing in addition to retained earnings. As in other 
countries, there is a trend for financial intermediation to move away from bank deposits and credit to 
nonbanking instruments and institutions. Enterprises and people tend to increasingly finance themselves 
from nonbank entities, such as investment companies (SOFOLES), savings and loan societies, credit 
unions, leasing companies, factoring companies, nonbank liabilities of listed Mexican companies, debt 
issues of unlisted companies, and credit-card financing provided by retail businesses. In recent years, 
nonbank institutions and foreign sources (liabilities contracted abroad) have become important providers 
of credit to the private sector (17 percent and 12 percent of GDP in 2002, respectively). 
At the micro level, there are concerns that economic agents such as enterprises and individual 
entrepreneurs face increasing levels of credit constraints, hampering their ability to make investments. 
Available survey data indicate that both enterprises and entrepreneurs participate in loan markets to a 
limited extent, especially in formal markets. For example, a survey of rural entrepreneurs in three 
Mexican states finds that 24 percent participated in loan markets, of which 7 percent borrowed from 
formal lenders in 1993-1994 (World Bank 1995). A recent survey of small- and medium-size enterprises 
in Mexico City finds that only 30 percent used bank loans in the past 12 months (World Bank 2002). The 
Bank of Mexico, which carries out a quarterly survey of 600 firms about their financing sources, reports 
that about 20 percent of enterprises surveyed use bank loans. 
Previous empirical evidence on the incidence of credit constraints in Mexico indicates its pervasiveness. 
Using a survey of farmers in the states of Sonora, Guanajuato, Puebla, and Tlaxcala, Stanton (1994) 
studies the access to credit by farmers in rural Mexico, estimating a disequilibrium model of supply and 
demand for loans (without distinguishing formal and informal sectors). The author finds that supply is 
significantly increased by the presence of collateral and the number of loans received in the past (likely 
evidence of good credit history), whereas demand is influenced by the usage of machinery in farming. 
The model predicts that over 80 percent of farmers receive the amount of credit that is determined by the 
supply function, and thus are credit constrained. Furthermore, educational attainment, size of land 
holdings owned, and usage of credit for land improvement have a positive effect, whereas nonfarm 
                                                      
4 For private and development banks only direct financing is included. 
5 Nevertheless, credit conditions appear to be improving in 2003: credit to the private sector grew at positive rates every month in 
2003 with year-on-year growth rates of at least 9 percent. 4 
 
employment by household members and perceived problems in obtaining credit have a negative effect on 
both the incidence and the amount of credit. In another study that examines credit constraints in rural 
Mexico, Key (1997) estimates a structural model that jointly determines production, consumption, and 
borrowing decisions of households. The author finds that about 32 percent of all formal borrowers are 
credit constrained (that is, they wished to borrow more than they were able to). The empirical model 
estimated that the high transaction costs of borrowing from formal lenders prevents small-scale farmers 
from accessing formal lenders, indicating that a reduction of those transaction costs may induce some 
small borrowers to switch from informal to formal sources of credit. 
As to manufacturing firms, the available evidence shows that credit constraints affect their investment 
patterns. First, for the period 1984-94, Gelos and Werner (1999) use the accelerator model of investment 
and the Euler equations, both augmented with cash flows indicator, to estimate the effect of financial 
liberalization on financing constraints of a set of 1,046 manufacturing firms. They find a strong link 
between cash flows and investment for most types of firms with smaller firms being more constrained. 
However, financial constraints were eased for small and exporting firms but not for large firms after 
financial liberalization. Second, Iscan (1998) estimates a version of the Euler equation to evaluate the 
impact of the debt crisis of 1982 on manufacturing sector investment. He finds very high discount rates if 
the 1982-1984 period is included in the sample and lower estimates (close to world interest rate plus 
spread) when this period is excluded. This suggests that this period of crisis was characterized by binding 
financing constraints. Third, Sánchez (2001) estimates an accelerator model of investment supplemented 
with a cash flows indicator using a 3-digit industry level data on manufacturing establishments for 1984-
99. He finds that cash flows have a significant effect on investment rates. Furthermore, capital 
expenditures of small firms are twice as sensitive to changes in cash flows than for large firms, suggesting 
that financing constraints are more severe for small firms. Lastly, the author finds increasing sensitivity to 
cash flows for small firms over time, and indication of worsening levels of credit constraints. Fourth, 
using balance sheet data for 176 listed firms for 1990-2000, Castaneda (2002) finds that both firms 
associated to economic groups and independent firms display less sensitivity of investments to cash flows 
following the 1995 crisis, which is a somewhat puzzling result for independent firms. A possible 
explanation is that firms with access to capital markets provide supplier credit to independent firms, 
recycling funds to the economy. An actively functioning internal capital markets that channel funds 
between members of an economic group would result in lowering credit constraints for members of an 
economic group. Another interesting finding is that firms that had relationships with banks experienced 
greater financing constraints, as a result of persistent weaknesses in the banking sector in this time period. 
Lastly, Cuevas and others (2002) present evidence of an amplification of liquidity constraints after the 
banking crisis for firms listed in the stock exchange as well as for manufacturing firms for the period 
1990-1999.   
This paper seeks to provide new evidence about the extent of credit constraints and their effect on 
investment using two recently completed surveys that distinguish four categories of economic agents: 
farmers and microentrepreneurs (also referred to as entrepreneurs or individuals) from a household 
survey; and agricultural and nonagricultural enterprises, from an enterprise survey. This paper does not 
intend to provide a definite answer about the roots and consequences of credit constraints, but rather tries 
to elaborate on the possible explanations of the limited use of formal or informal loans among 
entrepreneurs and enterprises in Mexico. Lastly, this paper attempts to estimate the effect of removing 
credit constraints on investment behavior. 
This paper defines credit constraints as a situation where rural agents report an unsatisfied demand for 
loans (formal or informal), which originates from rural agents having projects that are too risky or from 5 
 
impediments hindering the ability of rural agents and lenders to reduce information asymmetries.
6 This 
unmet demand for loans can also be explained by “true credit rationing,” which arises when creditors do 
not raise interest rates (in order to avoid an adverse selection problem) to clear the market and, instead, 
reject some loan requests from debtors that are willing to pay higher interest rates, and thus are perceived 
to be too risky. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 presents an overview of 
loan providers in Mexico. Section 4 discusses the methodology in this paper to measure the extent of 
credit constraints.  Section 5 presents indicators of participation in loan markets, measuring the extent of 
credit constraints and the self-reported demand for loans in both formal and informal markets. Section 6 
empirically analyzes the demand and supply of formal and informal loans. Section 7 studies investment 
behavior and assesses the effect of credit constraints. Section 8 summarizes the main findings.  
2.  Data sources 
This paper relies on two recently conducted surveys of households and enterprises in Mexico. Both 
surveys are representative at the national and regional level. The household survey covers farmers and 
microentrepreneurs—that is the so-called individual entrepreneurs (self-employed and employers) 
residing in localities with 2,500 to 50,000 inhabitants. It also covers those farmers living in localities with 
more than 50,000 residents. To identify entrepreneurs, the sample was drawn from the National 
Employment Survey for the quarter of October-December 2001. The enterprise survey includes 
agricultural and nonagricultural registered enterprises in localities with 2,500 to 50,000 inhabitants. In 
localities with more than 50,000 residents, the enterprise survey considers only enterprises in the 
agrobusiness and fishing sector (agricultural). In localities with less than 2,500 residents, the enterprise 
survey considers only large enterprises (with more than 100 workers). The sample was drawn from 
Mexico’s 1999 Economic Census. The enterprises can be legally established as either personas morales, 
or as personas físicas con actividad empresarial. To avoid an overlap with the household survey, the 
enterprise survey considers only enterprises with six workers or more.
7   
Table 1 summarizes survey results by geographical region and type of economic agent. The final sample 
of completed questionnaires contains responses for 1,825 farmers, 3,301 microentreprenurs, 1,073 
nonagricultural enterprises, and 954 agricultural enterprises.  
The household and enterprise surveys offer a unique collection of rarely available data about rural 
economic agents and their use of financial services. The questionnaire design of both surveys include 
questions about participation in financial markets, formal or informal, and the characteristics of the credit 
and savings products used by entrepreneurs and enterprises. The household survey questionnaire includes 
questions about expenses and income, fixed assets, inventories, employment, purchases and sale of fixed 
assets, marketing of products, suppliers, formality and social capital indicators, training received, 
                                                      
6 Loan markets are characterized for information asymmetries. Potential borrowers have better and more information about the 
true credit risk of investment projects than lenders. In those circumstances, lenders rely on different mechanisms to screen 
potential borrowers while potential borrowers use different mechanisms to signal their creditworthiness to lenders. 
7 The sampling design divides the Mexican territory into five regions according to Mexico’s National Development Plan. Region 
1 (South & Southeast) includes the states of Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and 
Yucatán. The following states plus Mexico City are included in region 2 (Center): Hidalgo, México, Morelos, Puebla, and 
Tlaxcala. Region 3 (Center-west) includes the states of Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, 
Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas. Region 4 (Northwest) includes the states of Baja California, Baja California Sur, 
Sinaloa, and Sonora. Region 5 (Northeast) includes the states of Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas. 6 
 
problems affecting the activity, and future plans. In addition, it contains questions about household 
characteristics (availability of services, other sources of income, wealth indicators, and dwelling features), 
land markets (farmers only), and incidence of adverse events (systemic and idiosyncratic). As for the 
enterprise survey, the questionnaire incorporates questions about formality and social capital indicators, 
exporting activities, employment, manager characteristics, purchases and sale of fixed assets, marketing, 
suppliers, training received, problems affecting the enterprise, future plans, and simplified financial 
statements. By combining household, business, and personal characteristics in a single survey, the data 
allows for a unique opportunity to examine the determinants of the demand and supply of credit, 
controlling for all those factors. 
3.  Classification of formal and informal lenders 
In the analysis that follows we differentiate between formal and informal lenders. Informal financial 
markets are prevalent in Mexico. For example, the World Bank (1995) finds that informal credit markets 
account for 87 percent of all credit transactions received by farmers and microentrepreneurs in three rural 
areas of Mexico. Moreover, formal and informal loans differ in important ways that have significant 
implications for demand and supply.  
Table 2 summarizes the classification of the providers of loans that we adopt for this paper. Formal 
lenders include private banks, development banks, and regulated and unregulated nonbanks that have 
been allowed to operate under the auspices of a particular piece of legislation. Informal lenders comprise 
companies and individual entrepreneurs that offer loans outside the purview of regulations. They 
comprise moneylenders, input suppliers, traders, and agrobusinesses that provide loans with a profit 
motive. Furthermore, loans from friends and relatives or from partners are also classified as informal in 
this paper. 
4.  Measuring credit constraints  
Despite difficulties involved in measuring credit constraints without directly observing them, two main 
approaches have emerged to identify credit constraints. The first approach, named “indirect method,” 
attempts to evaluate the extent of credit constraints by estimating disequilibrium models of demand and 
supply of loans.  These models face numerous difficulties in distinguishing supply from demand 
equations. In addition, empirical estimation of these models relies on complex estimation procedures. The 
second approach, dubbed “direct method,” relies on survey data with detailed questions about loan 
applications and the results of such applications.  While this avoids the problems associated with 
disequilibrium models, working with qualitative responses implies another type of challenge. The level of 
credit constraints (by how much) is not easily measurable. Survey data allows for estimates of the 
proportion of individual entrepreneurs with a self-reported demand for loans, but not necessarily whether 
those individual entrepreneurs would be considered creditworthy clients for certain types of lenders. In 
this regard, the incidence of credit constraints would provide an upper-bound measure of the extent of 
true credit constraints because not all credit-constrained agents will be considered creditworthy by 
lenders. 
The approach of this paper is to use the latter approach and infer the extent of credit constraints from the 
survey data. One of the advantages of the household and enterprise surveys collected in the current study 
is that they allow us to measure potential demand for loans and the extent of credit constraints by 7 
 
analyzing the proportion of firms/households that demand credit but are unable to obtain it.
8 We are able 
to identify firms/households that are constrained in the access to loan markets by looking at agents who 
have either applied for a loan and were denied or who needed the loan but have not applied (potential 
demand). Using the answers from various questions, we classify all surveyed respondents into 4 main 
participation categories guided by the decision tree showed in Figure 1. The categories are as follows: (1) 
not demanded, (2) demand but did not apply for a loan, (3) applied for a loan but was rejected, and (4) 
received a loan. 
The first category requires identifying respondents that do not demand loans (not demanded). Obviously, 
those agents who applied for loans in the past three years have a demand for loans. Nonetheless, some 
agents with a demand for loans may be reluctant to apply because of their perceptions of a complicated 
loan process with associated high transactions costs, lengthy procedures, or lack of knowledge about how 
to apply. These agents may find that the cost of applying exceeds the expected benefits of additional 
funds. Others are discouraged from applying because of a perception that their loan applications would 
have a high likelihood of rejection due to a lack of adequate collateral or co-signer, or pure 
discrimination. Another possibility is that agents are discouraged from applying because the loan products 
offered are ill-suited for their operations or interest rates and fees are too high. 
Figure 1: Participation in loan markets 
 
To separate those individual entrepreneurs or enterprises that did not apply for loans into the categories of 
“demand” and “no demand,” we use the self-reported reasons as why they did not apply for a loan. 
Specifically, we use the following responses as indicators of “no demand”: (a) prefers to use his own 
resources; (b) has access to other sources of financing (implying no demand for this source) and (c) has 
                                                      
8 When using indirect indicators to assess the incidence of credit constraints, the richness of the survey data determines how to 
identify credit-constrained agents. For example, Paulson and Townsend (2001) used as an indirect indicator of credit constraint—
those households that could increase the size of their business in a profitable way. Guiso (1998) defines credit constrained as 
those agents that wish a larger amount of credit at the current interest rate or had their loan application rejected. Levenson and 
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sufficient resources from business operations.
9 All other reasons for not requesting loans are classified as 
indicating “demand” for loans. Once we separated all those who have no demand, we consider everybody 
else as having a demand for loans. Therefore the demand category includes people who have demand but 
did not apply for loans, those who applied and were rejected, and those who applied and received a loan. 
In other words, the “demand” category encompasses agents in all the remaining categories (2)-(4) 
indicated in Figure 1. 
For the second category (demand but not apply) we group all people who have a demand for loan but did 
not apply for a loan. The third category (applied and rejected) contains all people who applied for a loan 
but were rejected by a lender. Finally, the fourth category groups all people who received a loan (we also 
refer to this category as people with access to loans). In addition, we split the category (4) into those who 
received the full amount requested (4a) and those who received a smaller amount than that requested (4b). 
We refer to the latter category (4b) as partially constrained.
10 
As shown in Figure 1, categories (2) and (3) are considered to be credit constrained, while categories (1) 
and (4) are considered as not constrained. As is clear from this classification, the credit-constrained 
category includes those who had demand but did not apply and those who applied and got rejected, 
whereas the unconstrained category contains those who do not have a demand for loans and those who 
have demand and are able to obtain the loans.  
Credit-constrained agents include three types of agents that are undistinguishable in the survey data. The 
first group comprises rural agents who claim they have a demand for loans, but are not considered 
creditworthy because of the high risk or low return on their prospective investment. This means that the 
lenders may require high interest rates to compensate for increased risks, and thus those agents would not 
borrow. The second group encompasses creditworthy clients that could not convey the sufficient signals 
about their creditworthy and that lenders could not identify because of the underlying lending technology. 
Lastly, credit-constrained agents also include potential debtors that are willing to pay higher interest rates, 
but that creditors reject to avoid an adverse selection problem. 
5.  Participation in loan markets  
In the analysis of participation in loan markets, we focus on only three outcomes because of data 
limitations. The first outcome includes those agents that do not demand loans. The second outcome 
studied is the so-called credit-constrained group, which includes both those who had demand but did not 
apply and those who applied and got rejected.
11 The last outcome includes those that have demand and are 
                                                      
9 Farmers and microenterprises predominantly respond with the first of these three reasons and less than 1 percent of the total 
population responds with reasons (b) and (c). Among enterprises reasons, (a) is still predominant while about 5 percent of the 
population also claims reasons (b) and (c).  
10 This is another possible dimension of credit constraints. However, the survey data indicates that only 3-5 percent of those who 
obtain the loans report that they applied for a larger amount. As a result, the incidence of “partially constrained” is minimal, and 
it is not studied in this report. 
11 An interesting observation, which is consistent with other surveys in Mexico, is the low percent of rejected loan applications. 
As shown in Table 3, about 1 percent of the total sample and about 4-6 percent of those who applied had their loan applications 
rejected with similar proportions for individual entrepreneurs and enterprises. This suggests a self-selection process where those 
individual entrepreneurs and enterprises that decide to apply expect to get their applications approved. Rejection rates are 
significantly higher for formal than for informal loan applications. We find an almost perfect self-selection in informal loans 
markets, partly explained by the nature of relationship between borrowers and lenders. In the case of informal lenders, which 
include friends and relatives or local moneylenders for individual entrepreneurs and partners and shareholders for enterprises, the 
concept of “applying” for a loan is not quite applicable, and it is not surprising that we observe a perfect self-selection. As 9 
 
able to obtain loans. Table 3a presents indicators of these three participation outcomes, differentiating 
between formal and informal loans. Table 3b presents indicators of the participation outcomes described 
in Figure 1.  
The survey data shows that the low participation rates in loan markets can be partially attributed to 
limited demand for loans. We find that the proportion of economic agents that do not demand loans is 
rather extensive, or conversely the demand for loans is limited. As shown in Table 3a and Table 3b, about 
53 percent of microentrepreneurs, 57 percent of farmers, 49 percent of nonagricultural enterprises, and 61 
percent of agricultural enterprises demand loans. Excluding microentrepreneurs, economic agents report a 
higher demand for formal loans than for informal ones. Furthermore, those in the agricultural sector 
(farmers and agricultural enterprises) are more likely to demand loans than their counterparts in the 
nonagricultural sector. 
Nevertheless, the incidence of credit constraints is pervasive across Mexico, especially among individual 
entrepreneurs. About 37 percent of microentrepreneurs, 41 percent of farmers, 19 percent of 
nonagricultural enterprises, and 21 percent of agricultural enterprises are credit constrained from both 
formal and informal lenders. The extent of credit constraints among individual entrepreneurs doubled that 
of enterprises. This greater incidence among individual entrepreneurs may result from the perception of 
lenders of more risks or higher transaction costs associated with providing small loans.
12 As shown in 
Table 3a, for individual entrepreneurs, the incidence of credit constraints is higher from formal lenders 
than from informal lenders. However, when examining the incidence of credit constraints across all types 
of lenders, we find that the degree of credit constraints is fairly homogenous across types of lenders with 
friends and relatives being the only exception. In the case of enterprises, the degree of credit constraints is 
higher for informal lenders than for formal ones. We observe that the degree of credit constraints for 
enterprises varies by type of lender. For example, enterprises appear to be the least constrained from 
private banks but the most constrained from development banks and nonbank intermediaries (See Table 
3b). 
Credit-constrained agents have an unmet demand for loans because the loan contract offered by formal 
and informal lenders do not match their needs. As shown in Table 4, credit-constrained individual 
entrepreneurs are unwilling to request loans mainly because of inadequate amounts and maturities (42 
percent) and high transaction costs (35 percent). High interest and fees deter only 1.5 percent of credit- 
constrained individual entrepreneurs from requesting loans. Enterprises are more concerned with high 
interest rates (23 percent) and high transaction costs (19 percent) than with inadequate maturities and 
amounts (9 percent). 
Insufficient information about loan application procedures deters many credit-constrained agents from 
requesting loans: about 27 percent of individual entrepreneurs and 18 percent of enterprises. This suggests 
that lenders are not marketing their products to rural agents or that lenders are not located close enough to 
rural agents. 
However, many other rural agents consider that they would not be considered creditworthy by lenders. 
The perception that their loan application will be rejected inhibits about 25 percent of individual 
entrepreneurs and 22 percent of enterprises from requesting loans. The percentage of credit-constrained 
                                                                                                                                                                           
expected, the percent of rejected applications to private banks for individual entrepreneurs is much larger than that for 
enterprises. As a percent of loan applicants, we observe 33 percent of rejected applications for both farmers and 
microentrepreneurs, while only 10 percent and 4 percent of nonagricultural and agricultural registered enterprises had their loan 
applications rejected. 
12 This indicates that the interest rates required to cover credit risk and transaction costs does not clear the market. 10 
 
agents that had their loan application rejected is fairly low (2.3 percent of individual entrepreneurs and 7 
percent of enterprises), which indicates a self-selection process.  
Another fraction of credit-constrained agents considered borrowing too risky (16 percent of individual 
entrepreneurs and 9 percent of enterprises). The perception that borrowing is too risky, however difficult 
to interpret, suggests that rural agents that responded in such manner must have considered that expected 
cost of default is higher than the expected benefits of borrowing: defaulting in their loans would have 
resulted in expected personal losses for themselves. Borrowers experience a loss when defaulting results 
in losing the properties pledged as collateral or in acquiring a bad reputation. In addition to the costs 
associated with defaulting, the expected cost of default is also affected by the probability of defaulting, 
which is influenced by the underlying production technology. This suggests that to meet the credit needs 
of credit-constrained agents factors affecting the cost of default and the probability of defaulting must be 
changed. 
Taking advantage of the self-reported demand for loans, we gauge the extent to which Mexico’s financial 
markets reach out to economic agents with a demand for loans. In this section we opt to scale the 
proportion of participants by the proportion demanding loans. This allows us to assess the level of market 
penetration by type of lenders: the proportion of those with a self-reported demand received loans. Table 
3c reports the financial market penetration for six types of formal or informal lenders. We find that the 
market penetration of formal and informal lenders in loan markets is in a dire state, especially for 
individual entrepreneurs, suggesting potential room for expansion.
13  For example, private banks reach 
about 2 percent of individual entrepreneurs demanding bank loans and 44 percent of nonagricultural 
enterprises and 46 percent of agricultural ones. Compared to private banks, the outreach of development 
banks is a little bit higher for farmers (4 percent) but substantially higher for enterprises (11 percent). 
Unregulated nonbank intermediaries reach about 6-8 percent of individual entrepreneurs with a demand 
for loans. Consistent with uneven levels of financial development across Mexico’s region, lenders’ 
outreach varies across geographical regions. In the Northwest region, all types of lenders seem to reach a 
higher share of farmers with demand than in other regions. In the Center-west region, they have better 
outreach of microentrepreneurs and enterprises (agricultural and nonagricultural). The South & Southeast 
region, which is the poorest region in the country, presents the lowest level of coverage from formal 
lenders. 
6.  The demand and supply of loans: empirical analysis 
What factors drive the probability of having a demand for loans? What affects the likelihood of receiving 
loans? In this section we look at the demand and supply of loans to get a sense of whether personal, 
business, or location characteristics have a differentiated effect. We model the demand and supply of 
loans as binary variables (0/1), concentrating on the loan market outcomes presented above. The 
proportion of individual entrepreneurs and enterprises that have rejected loan requests or that are either 
partially constrained are very small, focusing on only three outcomes: no demand, credit constrained, and 
received (access).
14  The category of credit constrained includes those agents that have a demand but did 
                                                      
13 It is difficult to measure the potential for expansion, as individual entrepreneurs and enterprises with a self-reported demand for 
loans may not necessarily be eligible for loans. Their eligibility would depend on the risk preference and lending technology of 
each type of lender. 
14 Although we find it interesting to study the determinants of those with demand who apply and who do not apply, the small 
number of applicants who applied and got rejected makes it impossible to do that. In addition, the identification strategy is very 
difficult. To estimate a structural model of those with demand who make the decision whether to apply or not, we need to assume 
that some variables help predict the application decision but do not help predict the demand and the lender’s decision to satisfy 11 
 
not apply and those that had their loan application rejected. We study formal and informal loans market 
separately because of the small fraction of participants in both markets. 
6.1  Empirical methodology 
Following the methodology of Bigsten and others ( 2003), we estimate the “demand equation” and the 
“access equation” (or alternatively the “supply” equation) jointly. The “access equation” only includes 
those individual entrepreneurs or enterprises with a demand for loans. This implies that the “demand 
equation” acts as a “selection equation,” controlling for the endogenous self-selection process in 
determining loan demand, and is estimated in the first stage. In the second stage, the probability of access 
is estimated only for those with demand. The equations estimated are: 
l i i i l i l i Z X demand demand no Demand , 2 1 , , ' ' ) 1 , 0 Pr( ) 1 (           
l i i l i l i X Demand access access no Access , 1 , , ' ) 1 1 , 0 Pr( ) 2 (          
where X denotes a vector of variables related to the demand and supply of loans, including household, 
personal, and business characteristics as well as location-specific indicators of economic conditions.
15 We 
include a number of variables to capture collateral availability, cash flow indicators, alternative sources of 
credit (supplier credit), and other variables to control for business heterogeneity. The success of the 
selection model depends on having variables that affect the demand for loans but do not affect the 
lender’s decision on access. This set of variables, which are not directly observable by the lender, 
corresponds to Z, referred to as “demand identification” variables. 
For individual entrepreneurs, the first group of variables includes sociodemographic variables that may 
influence the demand and supply of loans. Educational attainment may capture managerial skills, 
household wealth, and capacity to negotiate with lenders. A low level of education can act as a financial 
market entry barrier given the complexity of financial transactions (Schrieder, 1996). Ethnicity and 
gender (microentrepreneurs only) may be an important determinant of a household’s social network and 
access to information. Moreover, indigenous people and women may be the subject of discrimination by 
some lenders. The number of people in the household may affect the demand for loans because it proxies 
for the life-cycle stage of the household and thus for its desire to invest or its probability of having an 
emergency. We include the availability of other sources of household income, such as remittances and 
PROCAMPO (farmers only).  
The second set of variables encompasses characteristics of entrepreneurial activities. It includes indicators 
of firm size and collateral availability, such as age of activity, value of productive assets, formal or 
informal savings, and number of workers. Furthermore, it includes indicators of formality (registration 
with government institutions), social capital (membership with guilds), and training. In the regression for 
farmers we include indicators of land quality (irrigation) and land tenure (ejido), whether products are 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the application. In the absence of such variables we cannot be sure that we identify the application decision as opposed to the 
lender’s decision to grant the loan. 
15 Economic theory emphasizes that both household and business characteristics are important in determining the demand and 
supply of credit. The survey data allows for a unique opportunity to control for both groups of variables. 12 
 
sold outside the municipality or through an informal trader (coyote), and type of production (crops, 
livestock, and crop/livestock subproducts). 
For enterprises we include a set of variables relating the personal characteristics of the manager, such as 
gender, education, and ownership relationship, with the enterprise (main shareholder). Moreover, we 
include characteristics of the enterprise’s size, such as value of average assets and dummy variables for 
number of workers (large, medium, and small).
16 Other characteristics of the enterprise include: export, 
formality indicators (registration with government), social capital (membership with guilds), training, 
information technology (Internet), and acquisition of new technologies. 
For both individual entrepreneurs and enterprises, economic conditions in the municipality (state for 
enterprises) are captured by log of population, the share of agricultural workers, and the number of 
different types of lenders (individuals only). These variables control for agrarian conditions, market size, 
and infrastructure availability. The model also includes a set of region dummy variables to capture 
regional differences in both climate and infrastructures, both of which affect the demand and supply of 
loans. The availability of loans, and hence their opportunity cost, may vary with municipality size and 
other characteristics of the municipality. The number of different types of lenders in the municipality 
captures proximity to lenders, and financing costs.  
Demand identification variables (Z). A crucial part of this model is the “identification” assumption—the 
assumption that some variables influence one equation but not the other. Fortunately, the richness of the 
survey allows us to make such assumptions. We argue that some of the characteristics of individual 
entrepreneurs and enterprises that are available in the survey are likely to be correlated with their demand 
for loans, but unlikely to be observable by lender and therefore would not influence the lender’s decision 
on granting the loan.
17 Since these characteristics are not influencing the lender’s decision on access, they 
are not likely to enter in the “access” (or supply) equation.  
We grouped the “identification variables” in four categories. Below we discuss each of the variables and 
the intuition for their selection. In Table 5 we present a univariate t-test for our demand identification 
variables that helps to separate agents with demand and without demand for loans. Indeed, we find that 
most demand identification variables are statistically different for agents with demand and those without 
demand. 
The first category captures the entrepreneurial abilities of the individual; those with better abilities will 
likely to have more demand (for example, for expanding and improving the business). Such variables 
include (a) an indicator of whether the individual has taken preliminary steps before starting the business 
(which shows their enthusiasm and the level of preparation); and (b) whether they have inherited a 
business or a farm (those who did are less likely to have entrepreneurial spirit than those who started the 
business on their own accord). We find that these two variables increase demand for loans. 
The second category captures the need for funds. Farmers and microentrepreneurs may need funds 
because of adverse situations (shocks), or because the business is expanding. For individual entrepreneurs 
we include indicators of the incidence of adverse events, such as death or illness of household members, 
loss of income, or climatic shocks that occurred in the last three years. For enterprises we use indicators 
                                                      
16 The survey design stratified enterprises by number of workers, including four categories: large, medium, small, and micro. See 
INEGI (2002) for details. 
17 In addition we need to assume that people who expect to be rejected do not apply for loans. This is a reasonable assumption 
given our observations in the previous section.  13 
 
of reported problems that will result in a demand for funds. For example, if clients are late in making 
payments to the enterprise, or if the firm is late in its payment to suppliers, or the firm has experienced 
drop in earnings, it is likely that the enterprise would have a higher demand for funds. All these indicators 
are associated with increase in demand (except that the “clients paying late” is a really weak indicator).
18 
As an indicator of expansion prospects we use as a measure of whether the owner is planning to make 
improvements in the business, which strongly predicts more demand for both individual entrepreneurs 
and enterprises. For individual entrepreneurs we added an indicator of “no demand”—a dummy equal to 
one if respondents said they did not purchase any new assets because they did not need to (and since they 
did not need the new assets, it is likely they did not need much external funds). Finally, we consider two 
additional indicators of the need for funds. For individual entrepreneurs we use as an indicator whether 
they consider the present economic situation of the family to be better than five years ago. This turns out 
not to significantly predict demand. For enterprises we create an indicator for whether they claim to have 
no problems in commercializing their products. We see that those who claim no problem are likely to 
have less demand (because they are more likely not to want to make any major changes in the business).  
The fourth category contains variables capturing wealth, but is not observable to the lender. Individual 
entrepreneurs with more wealth are likely to have less need for external funds. As proxies for wealth we 
use the variables that were determined at the start of the business and therefore could be considered 
exogenous at the time of the loan application. For individual entrepreneurs we use two indicators: whether 
they have purchased a house with their own resources and whether they used personal savings to start a 
business (the latter is only available for microentrepreneurs). Both variables are negatively related to 
demand, as expected. For enterprises we use whether over 50 percent of the funds to start the business 
came from own resources. We do find that those who used their own resources are likely to have less 
demand for external funds (this is only significant for agricultural enterprises).
19 
6.2 Empirical results  
Individual entrepreneurs 
In this section, we concentrate the analysis on the partial derivates of the regressors on each of the three 
participation outcomes, pointing out differences between formal and informal markets. Table 6a through 
6d report those partial derivatives evaluated at mean values of the explanatory values. Thus, the empirical 
results can be interpreted as those of the “average” farmer or microentrepreneur. Below we discuss only 
variables that have significant coefficients, which is indicated by the p-values reported in brackets next to 
the partial derivates. 
                                                      
18 We also consider those who state that excessive competition is a problem and those that complain of inadequate demand, but 
do not find them to be significant. 
19 We explore another indicator: whether over 50 percent of the funds to start the business came from inheritance. But there are 
no more then 2 percent of those who used inheritance as over 50 percent of funds at the start of the business, and thus we do not 
use this variable. 14 
 
Who demands loans? 
The profile of microentrepreneurs or farmers with a higher propensity to demand formal loans is broadly 
similar to those demanding informal loans. This suggests that entrepreneurs’ demand for loans is not tied 
to a specific provider, but rather associated with business, personal, and household needs. 
Microentrepreneurs more likely to demand loans have the following characteristics. Education: More 
educated microentrepreneurs are more likely to demand loans. The probability of demanding loans from 
formal lenders would increase by 9.7 percentage points with primary education and by 6.4 percentage 
points with secondary education (significant at 11 percent). The estimated effects are similar for 
demanding informal loans. Age: A lower demand for loans is more likely in the tails of the age 
distribution of microentrepreneurs. The results show an inverse U-shape relationship between age and 
demand for loans, suggesting that middle-age microentrepreneurs are more likely to demand loans. 
Younger microentrepreneurs may be uncertain about their true business possibilities and thus their 
demand for loans may be lower.
20 Older microentrepreneurs may have less uncertainty about their 
entrepreneurial abilities but no plans to expand, thus lowering their demand for borrowing. Gender: Male 
microentrepreneurs do not have a significantly different demand for formal loans after controlling for 
other variables, although they are marginally less likely to demand informal loans (significant only at 
about 14 percent). Labor market experience: Microentrepreneurs that reported previous experience as 
salaried workers are more likely to demand loans (about 5.5 percentage points). 
Farmers more likely to demand loans have the following characteristics.  Selling strategy: Farmers selling 
outside the municipality or through informal traders (coyotes) are more likely to demand loans. These 
results suggest that marketing strategies pursued by farmers are associated with a need for external funds. 
It is possible that to sell outside the municipality, farmers may need to incur transportation costs, 
increasing their demand for loans at the time of selling. Irrigated land: Farmers working irrigated land 
may have a higher demand for loans due to their larger size of operations and their need to pay for 
irrigation services. Livestock and subproducts: Lastly, farmers that produce subproducts from their 
agricultural and livestock productions are less likely to demand loans. Farmers may engage in those 
activities to generate additional income, decreasing their demand for external funds. 
Indicators of participation in savings markets and use of trade credit affect the demand for loans for both 
farmers and microentrepreneurs, suggesting interactions between different financial instruments. 
Individual entrepreneurs that have formal savings seem to have a lower demand for informal loans (about 
14 percentage points for farmers and 9.5 percentage points for microentrepreneurs), but they do not have 
a lower or higher demand for formal loans. This can be interpreted as a possible substitution between 
formal savings and informal borrowing to cope with adverse events. Participating in informal savings 
markets increases the likelihood of demanding informal loans for both farmers and microentrepreneurs 
(9.2 and 6.1 percentage points, respectively), and of demanding formal loans for microentrepreneurs only 
(7 percentage points). Buying inputs on credit increases the likelihood of demanding loans (significant at 
the 15 percent level for formal lenders) for both farmers and microentrepreneurs. It seems that individual 
entrepreneurs that have access to trade credit may have unexpected cash flow demands, and thus tend to 
demand more loans. Selling goods or services on credit increases the demand for loans for farmers (about 
                                                      
20 Household-induced demand for loans may be also lower for younger individual entrepreneurs. 15 
 
12.6 percentage points for formal lenders and 11.7 percentage points for informal lenders). Farmers 
selling on credit may demand loans to finance a possible maturity mismatch between incoming funds 
from client payments and payments for input purchases. In contrast, microentrepreneurs that sell on credit 
are less likely to demand formal loans (about 5 percentage points). 
We find that size, formality, and social capital indicators are not statistically significant in explaining the 
demand for loans. In particular, the value of assets, the presence of workers, registration with government 
agencies, membership to guilds, or age of the business are not related with the demand for loans for both 
farmers and microentrepreneurs. 
Among the household characteristics, we find that receiving remittances increases the demand for 
informal loans. This is somewhat counterintuitive as remittances provide extra funds that could be used 
for investment. The likely reason is that remittances are used as implicit collateral in informal lending and 
allow recipients to leverage up the amounts received as remittances to obtain additional (informal) loans. 
Furthermore, it is possible that remittances and informal borrowing are substitute strategies when dealing 
with adverse events. Receiving PROCAMPO transfers does not influence the demand for loans of 
farmers. 
Variations across regions and type of municipality affect the demand for loans. Excluding the demand for 
informal loans of microentrepreneurs, individual entrepreneurs located in more agrarian municipalities 
have a lower propensity to demand loans as well as those in larger municipalities. In terms of regions, the 
regression result shows that microentrepreneurs in the Center, Center-west, and Northwest regions are 
less likely to demand loans. Farmers located in the Center region are less likely to demand loans. 
We find that adverse events appear to trigger a higher demand for loans. Not surprising, those farmers 
reporting a climatic shock will demand more loans to cope with adverse consequences associated with 
those types of shocks. In the case of microentrepreneurs, health and household income shocks increase 
the likelihood of demanding formal or informal loans. These findings suggest a potential role for loan 
markets in assisting farmers to cope with systemic or idiosyncratic shocks.  
Another interesting finding is that individual entrepreneurs with more entrepreneurial ability or expansion 
prospects are more likely to demand loans. For example, labor market experience, which is a proxy for 
entrepreneurial ability, will increase the probability of demanding loans (of any type) for both 
microentrepreneurs and farmers. Furthermore, those microentrepreneurs that took preliminary steps to 
start the business, another proxy of entrepreneurial ability, are more likely to demand informal loans only. 
As expected, those individual entrepreneurs that reported lack of opportunities to make fixed investments 
in their operations are less likely to demand loans. 
Who is credit constrained? 
Microentrepreneurs: characteristics affecting the probability of being credit constrained from formal 
lenders. Salaried work experience: They report having previous experience as salaried workers (about 5.6 
percentage points more likely). Age: Furthermore, age positively affects the incidence of credit constraints 
from formal lenders with an inverted-U relationship, suggesting that middle-age microentrepreneurs are 16 
 
more constrained. Formal education: More educated microentrepreneurs present a higher propensity to be 
credit constrained: 9.6 percentage points more likely for those with primary education and 6.5 percentage 
points more likely for those with secondary education (significant at 11 percent).
21 Assets: Consistent with 
the literature, we find that less wealthy microentrepreneurs are more likely to be credit constrained. For 
example, a 1 percent increase in asset value would result in a reduction of the credit constrained 
probability of 0.8 for microentrepreneurs. Formal savings: Having formal savings is another indicator of 
wealth (financial), and thus, we also find a negative effect. For the average microentrepreneurs, not 
having formal savings increases the likelihood of being credit constrained by 5.3 percentage points 
(significant at 11 percent). Informal savings: However, participating in informal savings mechanisms 
increases the odds of being credit constrained from formal lenders (about 4.9 percentage points).  This is 
likely a reverse causality: those credit constrained in formal sector are more likely to participate in 
informal savings.  Trade credit: Buying inputs on credit increases the likelihood of being credit 
constrained by 5.3 percentage points. Selling on credit:  However, those selling goods on credit are less 
likely to be credit constrained from formal lenders. Adverse events: Lastly, microentrepreneurs affected 
by adverse events, such as death or illness of household members (health shocks), loss of income 
(household income shocks), or climatic shocks are more likely to be credit constrained from formal 
lenders. 
Microentrepreneurs: characteristics affecting the probability of being credit constrained from informal 
lenders. The likelihood of being credit constrained from informal lenders is influenced by a smaller set of 
variables. Gender:  Female microentrepreneurs are more likely to be credit constrained from informal 
lenders (about 4.8 percentage points). Formal savings: Having formal savings, a proxy of wealth, 
decreases the likelihood of being credit constrained from informal lenders (significant at 14 percent 
level), suggesting a wealth effect. Selling on credit: Those microentrepreneurs that sell their goods on 
credit are also less likely to be credit constrained (about 6.8 percentage points). Adverse events: Lastly, 
microentrepreneurs affected by adverse events, such as death or illness of household members (health 
shocks), or loss of income (household income shocks) are more likely to be credit constrained from 
informal lenders. 
Farmers: factors associated with the likelihood of being credit constrained from formal lenders. Salaried 
work experience: Similar to microentrepreneurs, farmers with previous salaried work experience are more 
likely to be credit constrained (about 7.1 percentage points). Livestock production: Moreover, when 
farmers are involved in livestock production, their chances of being credit constrained from formal 
lenders increases by about 5.8 percentage points. Selling on credit: In contrast to the findings for 
microentrepreneurs, farmers that sell on credit are more likely to be credit constrained from formal 
lenders (about 12 percentage points). Climatic shocks: Farmers affected by climatic shocks are more 
likely to be credit constrained (about 10 percentage points). Entrepreneurial spirit: Indicators of 
entrepreneurial spirit, such as taking preliminary steps to start the business or planning to make 
improvements in the business, increase the odds of being credit constrained.
22 Remittances: Farmers 
receiving remittances are more likely to be credit constrained (about 6.7 percentage points). 
                                                      
21 Because more educated microentrepreneurs are also more likely to demand loans, thus it is not surprising to find that they have 
a higher incidence of credit constraints. 
22 Because farmers that took preliminary steps and are planning to make business improvements are also more likely to demand 
loans, it is not surprising to find that they have a higher incidence of credit constraints. 17 
 
We observe vast regional variations in the likelihood of being credit constrained. Microentrepreneurs 
located in the Center, Center-west, and North-west regions are less likely to be credit constrained from 
both formal or informal lenders.  In the case of farmers, region matters only in the case of informal 
lenders.  The Northeast region is less likely to be credit constrained. 
Regional economic conditions seem to affect the incidence of credit constraints. Farmers and 
microentrepreneurs that live in more agrarian municipalities are less likely to be credit constrained from 
formal and informal lenders, but as indicated in the previous section, they also have less demand overall. 
The results also show regional differences in the extent of credit constraints. For example, 
microentrepreneurs located in the Center, Center-west, and North-west regions are less likely to be credit 
constrained. Similarly, farmers located in those regions have less chance of being credit constrained from 
informal lenders. Only farmers residing in the Center region have a smaller likelihood of being credit 
constrained from formal lenders. An interesting finding is that farmers and microentrepreneurs do not 
face a higher degree of credit constraints by operating in the South & Southeast region. 
In summary, the results show that those more likely to be credit constrained are also more likely to 
demand loans. This seemingly counterintuitive result could possibly be explained by the combination of 
two forces: (a) the predicted and actual proportions of receiving formal and informal loans are very small, 
and thus the model captures the relevant variables that identify the demand for loans; and (b) formal and 
informal lenders could build their lending decisions on unobservable factors that are not captured by the 
variables included in the model. Another finding is that the marginal effects on the probability of being 
credit constrained are larger for farmers than for microentrepreneurs for the significant variables. 
Who receives loans? 
Farmers more likely to receive formal loans have the following characteristics. PROCAMPO benefits 
significantly increase the likelihood of access to formal loans to farmers, possibly because formal lenders 
use these benefits as implicit collateral. Ethnicity: They do not speak indigenous languages, possibly 
indicating language barrier. Formality indicators are associated with better access to formal loans. Indeed, 
registration with government agencies and membership with guilds increases access to formal loans by 
4.3 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively. Training or technical assistance: Furthermore, we find that 
receiving training or technical assistance is associated with better access to formal loans, suggesting some 
complementarities between formal loans and training. Certified seeds: Farmers who use genetically 
improved crops have more access to formal loans, likely because using genetically modified crops is 
associated with higher productivity and therefore higher cash flows. Livestock production: Farmers that 
do not engage in livestock production are about 2.3 percentage points more likely to borrow from formal 
lenders. Irrigated land: Farmers working irrigated land are more likely to receive formal loans 
(significant at 13 percent). Regions: We did not find regional differences in access to formal loans. The 
only exception is that farmers in urban areas are less likely to receive formal loans (significant at 11 
percent). 
Farmers that borrow from informal lenders have different characteristics than those borrowing from 
formal ones.  Education and salaried work: We find that farmers that worked as salaried workers and do 
not have formal education tend to borrow more from informal lenders. Coyotes: Furthermore, farmers that 
sell through informal traders (coyotes) have a greater propensity to borrow from informal lenders (about 18 
 
2.9 percentage points). Assets and formal savings: A surprising finding is that farmers with more assets 
and with formal savings borrow more from informal lenders, which may reflect a particularity of the 
survey data. Regional variations: Lastly, we find significant regional variations in access to informal 
loans. Farmers located in the more populated and more agrarian municipalities have better access to 
informal lenders. Informal lenders are more likely to grant loans to farmers located in the South & 
Southeast, Center, Center-west, and Northwest regions.  
Microentrepreneurs receiving loans from formal lenders present the following characteristics. They are 
more likely to be male (significant at 12 percent), are middle-aged, sell outside the municipality 
(significant at 12 percent), work in manufacturing, have formal savings, have informal savings, register 
with government agencies (significant at 11 percent), and have younger operations. Microentrepreneurs 
located in the Center region have less access to formal loans whereas those located in the Center-west 
have more access. 
Microentrepreneurs receiving loans from informal lenders are more likely to receive remittances, have 
experience as a salaried worker, are middle-age, have more education, have younger operations, do not 
have formal savings, have informal savings, made sales on credit, and bought inputs on credit. We find 
some regional differences. Microentrepreneurs located in the South and Southeast and Center-west 
regions have greater propensity to borrow from informal lenders as well as those residing in larger and 
more agrarian municipalities. 
There are some surprising findings with respect to access to informal lenders.  First, the results indicate 
that more educated microentrepreneurs and farmers with more assets are more likely to borrow from 
informal lenders. This is contrary to the prior belief that informal lenders serve “worse-off” individual 
entrepreneurs or smaller businesses.  Another surprising finding is that access to formal lenders does not 
present regional variations for farmers. 
Enterprises  
In this section, we concentrate the analysis on the partial derivates of the regressors on each of the three 
participation outcomes, pointing out differences between formal and informal markets. Table 6e and 6f 
report those partial derivatives evaluated at mean values of the explanatory values. Thus, the empirical 
results can be interpreted as those of the “average” enterprise. Below we discuss only variables that have 
significant coefficients, which is indicated by the p-values reported in brackets next to the partial 
derivates. We report estimations combining both agricultural and nonagricultural enterprises because the 
data contain the same explanatory variables. However, to account for unexplained differences across 
economic sector, we include two dummy variables to distinguish agricultural and manufacturing 
enterprises from enterprises in other economic sectors.  
Who demands loans? 
Similar to the results for individual entrepreneurs, we find that indicators of business size or business age 
do not influence the demand for loans. This suggests that small and medium-size enterprises are not more 
likely to demand loans than large or micro ones or that younger enterprises demand more loans than older 
ones. 19 
 
Firms that export, plan to make improvements in the business, buy on credit, and report some problems 
are also more likely to demand loans.  Enterprises exporting their production are about 7.4 and 9.6 
percentage points more likely to demand formal and informal loans, respectively.  To export, enterprises 
may need additional sources of funding.  Firms than plan to introduce changes in their operations, such as 
product differentiation, new markets, or reduce costs, are more likely to demand formal loans (about 6.3 
percentage points). Buying on credit increases odds of demand for loans (10.6 percentage points for 
formal loans and 8.4 percentage points for informal loans). Firms reporting problems, such as low selling 
prices, low earnings, or commercialization obstacles, are more likely to demand loans. 
The demand for loans varies across regions and economic sector. Enterprises located in the South & 
Southeast region are about 12 percentage points more likely to demand loans. Agricultural enterprises 
tend to demand more loans (about 12.6 percentage points more likely). When they are located in urban 
areas the probability to demand loans is only 3.4 percentage points higher. Manufacturing firms are not 
more likely to demand loans. 
Less formal enterprises are more likely to demand informal loans. We find that enterprises that do not use 
external auditors, are not registered with government institutions, and do not offer training to their 
workers, are 6 to 14 percentage points more likely to demand informal loans. 
There are some surprising results. A surprising result is that enterprises with managers with more formal 
education tend to demand fewer loans. Another surprising result is that enterprises registered with 
government institutions are less likely to demand formal loans. This suggests that larger enterprises, 
which are mostly registered with government institutions, prefer to rely on internal source of funds, 
maintaining control of their enterprises. A somewhat surprising result is that the use of technology and 
innovations is not significant. It is likely that the effect of the technology is likely to be captured by other 
variables included in the regression, such as size and manager education. 
Who is credit constrained?  
Similar to the results for individual entrepreneurs, enterprises with more productive assets (larger) and 
with formal savings are less likely to be credit constrained from formal lenders. For example, a one 
percent increase in an enterprise’s assets would reduce the probability of credit constraints from formal 
lenders by 3.2 percentage points. For the average enterprise, having formal savings reduces the chances of 
being credit constrained by 8.4 percentage points, suggesting that those without formal savings are 
significantly more constrained from formal lenders.
23 By contrast, we do not observe a wealth/size effect 
for being credit constrained from informal lenders. Another interesting finding is that after controlling for 
wealth, firm size measured by the number of employees does not affect the likelihood of being credit 
constrained for the average enterprise. 
Older enterprises are less likely to be credit constrained. For the average enterprise, the chance of being 
credit constrained is about 8 percentage points lower for 7-10 year old enterprises (for informal lenders) 
                                                      
23 Indeed, about 42 percent of enterprises without formal savings are credit constrained compared to 22 percent of their 
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and about 8.6 percentage points for 11-15 year old enterprises (for formal lenders). It is possible that 
enterprises in the 7-15 year old bracket have proven their potential, and thus have accumulated internal 
funds. 
Membership with an economic group decreases the incidence of credit constraints. Being a part of the 
economic group decreases the magnitude of constraints from informal lenders by about 7 percentage 
points for the average enterprise. This suggests that those companies are also more likely to receive 
informal loans, possibly from their parent company. Furthermore, enterprises that belong to an economic 
group are about 4.4 percentage points less likely to be credit constrained from formal lenders (significant 
at 11 percent level). 
After controlling for other firm and regional characteristics, the economic sector of activity is not an 
important determinant of the propensity of being credit constrained. We find that agricultural enterprises 
have more demand for formal loans, while they are not differently constrained than the nonagricultural 
enterprises. Agricultural enterprises in urban areas are less likely to be credit constrained from informal 
lenders (significant at 13 percent level). 
Regional economic conditions affect the incidence of credit constraints. Enterprises located in states with 
more people working in the agricultural sector are less likely to be credit constrained.  For the average 
enterprise, the probability of being credit constrained from formal lenders is about 20 percentage points 
higher if located in the South & Southeast. Enterprises located in the Center, Center-west, and Northwest 
regions are less likely to be credit constrained from informal lenders. 
Who receives loans? 
The empirical model shows that enterprises that are more likely to receive formal loans have the 
following characteristics: have more assets, have been in operations for more than 25 years (significant at 
11 percent), export (significant at 12 percent), have a main shareholder managing the firm (9 percentage 
points), buy or sell goods on credit (8-9 percentage points), have formal savings (9 percentage points), 
report using the Internet for the business (7.3 percentage points), plan to make improvements in the 
business (5.8 percentage points), and report some problems in their operations (6- 9 percentage points). 
We find that a firm’s total assets have the strongest correlation with receiving formal loans, suggesting 
that formal lenders cater to larger enterprises.  In addition to indicating a wealth effect, having formal 
savings allows formal lenders gather information about their clients by examining their savings behavior 
with formal institutions. 
Enterprises more likely to borrow from informal lenders have the following characteristics: foreign 
owners (5.8 percentage points), managers without college education (7.4 percentage points), have more 
employees, have been in operations for more than 25 years, are members of an economic group (6.1 
percentage points), buy on credit (6.6 percentage points), have formal savings (5.4 percentage points), do 
not use external auditors (8.2 percentage points), are registered with guilds or chamber of activities (4.3 
percentage points), and report problems in their operations. It is reasonable to find that firms that are part 
of economic groups are significantly more likely to receive informal loans because informal loans are 
likely to come from those groups.  21 
 
Some regions and economic sectors are more likely to receive loans. Agricultural enterprises are about 
15.4 percentage points more likely to borrow from formal lenders, but if located in urban areas they are 
less likely to receive formal loans (10 percentage points). Enterprises located in the South & Southeast, 
Center, Center-west, and Northwest regions have more access to informal loans. However, enterprises 
operating in the South & Southeast, Center, and Northwest regions are less likely to borrow from formal 
lenders. This suggests a differentiate pattern between formal and informal lenders.  
The regression results present some surprising findings.  We find that enterprises registered with 
government agencies and with foreign owners are less likely to receive formal loans. Another surprising 
finding is that enterprises with more workers are more likely to borrow from informal lenders. 
7.  Investment and credit constraints  
We start our analysis of investment in Table 7a and Table 7b, which report the proportion of survey 
respondents that undertook any investment in capital goods in recent years and the ratio of investment to 
fixed assets.
24 For registered enterprises we scale the value of investment in each year by the net value of 
total fixed assets in that year. For households we estimate the value of fixed assets by taking the sum of 
estimated replacement value of owned machinery and equipment, vehicles, or real estate, which gives us a 
rough equivalent to the value of fixed assets on the enterprise balance sheet. Then we scale the value of 
new purchases (which has been translated to 2002 pesos using inflation rates) by the estimated value of 
fixed assets. Similarly, we scale investment in land by the current value of land. This produces a ratio, 
which gives us percent of additional (new) investment relative to existing stock of machinery and 
equipment. We refer to this ratio as investment to capital ratio, denoted by I/K. 
A small number of individual entrepreneurs made investments compared to enterprises. As shown in 
Table 7b, microentrepreneurs show a higher incidence of investment than farmers (37 percent versus 27 
percent), which is partly attributed to differences in economic activity. At the other extreme, most 
enterprises (close to 80 percent) have invested in machinery and equipment in the past two years.
 25 Land 
markets appear inactive because less than 5 percent of farmers purchased land in the past five years.
26   
The incidence of investment varies widely across regions, especially among individual entrepreneurs. 
Farmers and microentrepreneurs located in the Center region present the lowest incidence of investment 
in Mexico, 11 percent and 26 percent, respectively, which is about 1.4 and 2.6 times lower than the 
national average. Those living in the South & Southeast region are more likely to invest than their 
counterparts in the rest of the country. In the case of enterprises, regional variations are less pronounced, 
but still enterprises in the Center-west region are slightly more likely to have invested in the past two 
years. 
Individual entrepreneurs and enterprises invest small amounts relative to their existing stock of fixed 
assets. As shown in Table 7b, the median investment to capital ratio, for those agents with investment, is 
                                                      
24 The time horizons are different for different respondents. For the household sample we have indicators and amounts of 
investment in machinery and equipment during the past 3 years, and investment in land during the past 5 years. For the amount of 
investment we translate all values into current 2002 pesos to make them comparable with the current replacement value of assets. 
For enterprises we have investment in each of the two last years—2000 and 2001. For comparison with households in Table 7a 
we give summary statistics for the two-year average investment for the registered enterprises. 
25 When we look at each year separately, the proportions of enterprises investing are very similar. 
26 This also presents difficulty for the analysis of land purchase decisions, as the sample size is very small. As a consequence, 
most of the results for the land purchase are not significant. 22 
 
about 10 percent-17 percent. Farmers and agricultural enterprises located in the Center region tend to 
invest less, relative to their assets than their counterparts in the rest of the country. In the case of farmers 
purchasing land, we observe that the investment to capital ratio is substantially larger.  This could be 
because current land values are excessively higher than existing land, or because land purchases tend to 
be larger because of indivisibility. 
Are credit constraints associated with the incidence of investment and to the investment to capital ratio? 
In Table 7a, we report the percent of people with investment in each of the loan market participation 
categories studied in section 6: no demand, credit constrained (demand but not apply and rejected), 
received formal loans, and received informal loans.
27   
Microentrepreneurs and farmers that borrowed from formal or informal lenders are significantly more 
likely to make investments into productive assets and land than nonborrowers. Moreover, those borrowers 
from informal lenders are more likely to invest than those borrowers from formal lenders. This is a 
surprising result because entrepreneurs report using formal loans for investment in more occasions than 
informal loans both in terms of amounts or number of transactions. Another interesting observation is that 
credit-constrained individual entrepreneurs tend to invest more than those without a demand for loans. 
This result could reflect the reverse causality: that those who make investment are more likely to have 
demand for loans (and hence those who do not require new investment are more likely to have no demand 
for funds). In addition, credit-constrained individual entrepreneurs still might have at least some access to 
alternative sources of funds (such as retained earnings and their own savings). Therefore it is not very 
surprising that people with demand (including credit-constrained individual entrepreneurs) make more 
investments than those without demand. 
In the case of enterprises, we also find that the incidence of investment is higher among borrowers from 
formal or informal lenders than nonborrowers with the exception of nonagricultural enterprises borrowing 
from formal lenders. A somewhat surprising result is that credit-constrained agricultural enterprises 
present a lower incidence of investment than their counterparts with no demand for loans. For the 
nonagricultural enterprises the difference is not significant. In the case of agricultural enterprises this 
suggests that the self-reported indicator of loan demand may not necessarily reflect investment 
opportunities, in contrast with the findings for individual entrepreneurs. Finally, enterprises borrowing 
from formal lenders are more likely to invest than their counterparts receiving informal loans and 
nonborrowers. 
7.1 Individual entrepreneurs  
What determines whether microentrepreneurs or farmers invest? What factors affect the size of 
investment? This section explores these questions for investment in capital goods (machinery and 
equipment) and in land purchases. We study the discrete choice of investment with a probit model and the 
ratio of amount invested to total owned assets (I/K) with a tobit model, which accommodates for the large 
proportion of individual entrepreneurs that do not make any investment. The equations estimated are: 
(3)  Invest = Pr (0=no invest, 1 = invest) = αGROWTH +βEXPECT+γABILITY+δFUNDS+ φFINANCE+ε 
                                                      
27 Individual entrepreneurs or enterprises borrowing from both formal or informal lenders sources are classified as borrowing 
from formal lenders. The category of credit constrained includes those individual entrepreneurs or enterprises that are credit 
constrained from either formal or informal lenders. Using these criteria, we create four mutually exclusive categories of 
participation in loan markets. 23 
 
(4)  I/K = αGROWTH +βEXPECT+γABILITY+δFUNDS+φFINANCE+ε 
We posit an investment model based on the following arguments. Two main forces determine investment 
decisions: (a) opportunities to grow and improve the business; and (b) the availability and cost of funds. 
In the regression analysis we use several proxies for each of the two main forces.   
We proxy for the growth opportunities (GROWTH) with several variables.
28 First, firm size may reflect a 
desire to grow. For example, larger businesses may be more likely to have reached their optimal scale and 
therefore their opportunities for expansion may be less attractive.
29 We measure firm size by the value of 
productive assets or total land, as an indicator for whether or not the owner hires workers. Second, the 
ratio of borrowed assets to owned assets suggests available opportunities for expansion. Nonetheless, this 
variable may capture two opposing forces. On one hand, those who use more rented equipment relative to 
their own may want to invest, perhaps to purchase the assets they are currently using for production, 
reducing uncertainties in case they have to return them. On the other hand, those that do not invest will 
have less owned assets and therefore a higher ratio of rented to borrowed assets. Using similar arguments 
we use the ratio of borrowed to owned land for the farmers’ regression. Third, for farmers we also use a 
dummy variable for whether land has irrigation, which captures land quality and therefore farm 
productivity. Lastly, similar to firm size, older businesses are likely to have reached their optimal scale of 
operations and thus are less likely to invest 
Investment is also driven by the expectations of the future returns (EXPECT). The survey contains some 
useful indicators. Those individual entrepreneurs that consider that the present economic situation of the 
household is better than five years ago may expect the future to be brighter. Likewise, those individual 
entrepreneurs that plan to expand their operations may be more likely to invest. Finally, the state of the 
life cycle of the entrepreneur would clearly affect its expectation, with older individual entrepreneurs 
being less likely to invest and more likely to maintain the current scale of their activities.  
The entrepreneurial ability of the owner may also influence their investment behavior (ABILITY). 
Entrepreneurial ability is captured by several variables: a dummy for those who have a labor market 
experience; a dummy for those who have labor experience in the United States; a dummy equal to one if 
the owner took preliminary steps before starting the business; and a dummy for participation in a training 
program (as training programs can possibly improve the ability of the owners and the productivity of the 
business). 
Importantly, the availability of internal funds would also affect investment behavior (FUNDS). In this 
respect, we include indicators of other sources of funds that have been shown in other studies to reduce 
credit constraints. For example, PROCAMPO benefits might stimulate investment simply because the 
benefits are perceived as “additional funds” by the recipient, and can be used for any purpose. Likewise, 
formal or informal savings represent available funds that could be used for investment. 
Most important, we study the effects that access to finance has on investment (FINANCE). To control for 
access to loans we include dummies for whether individual entrepreneurs have received a formal or 
                                                      
28 Actual growth rate of business is one of the best indicators of growth opportunities, as it is likely that fast-growing businesses 
will have more attractive growth opportunities and would like to expand and invest more. We tried to test the actual growth rate 
from year 2000 to 2001 and it was positive in some specifications; however, many observations are missing on this variable, and 
it appears to have substantial measurement problems. Therefore we do not include it in the tables.  
29 Given that we consider very small businesses, this argument is not likely to be binding. However, some people argue that many 
micro businesses are simply “subsistence” businesses—that owners run these businesses to provide a stable source of income 
without plans for expansion and growth.  24 
 
informal loan during that period to see whether those who received loans have more investment. To 
separate individual entrepreneurs with and without demand, we include a dummy variable that equals one 
if agents have demand but no application to either source (formal or informal). After we control for those 
with access to loans, this variable effectively separates those with and without demand for loans. We refer 
to this indicator as “credit constrained” in the tables.  Finally, we control for economic conditions in the 
municipality of residence and regional differences. 
Tables 8a through 8c present the partial derivatives (at mean values) from the estimation of equations (3) 
and (4) to analyze the investment behavior of farmers and microentrepreneurs. In the case of equation (4) 
we present the partial derivatives for positive values of the I/K ratio.  
Microentrepreneurs and farmers with more potential for growth are more likely to invest in fixed assets as 
well as to invest more. We find that microentrepreneurs and farmers are more likely to invest if they have 
better growth opportunities and have more total productive assets (or land value). But those 
microentrepreneurs who rent or borrow more assets are less likely to invest. This may reflect reverse 
causality: those who did not invest much have to rent or borrow more assets. Microentrepreneurs that hire 
workers are 10.7 percentage points more likely to invest and their I/K ratio would be 3.8 percentage 
points higher. In contrast, farmers that hire workers are 5.1 percentage points less likely to invest in fixed 
assets and their I/K ratio is not significantly different. 
Older microentrepreneurs and farmers as well as microentrepreneurs with older operations tend to invest 
less than their younger counterparts. Microentrepreneurs with older operations are not only less likely to 
invest, but also would invest smaller amounts relative to total assets, likely because they have already 
reached an optimal size of operations. In contrast, farmers with older operations have a higher propensity 
to invest in capital goods but are less likely to purchase land. Older farmers and microentrepreneurs invest 
less in capital goods as their prospects for growth may be curbed by their age. However, the age of the 
farmers is not associated with land purchases. 
Indicators of future business plans and positive outlook are significantly related to investment. 
Microentrepreneurs and farmers who state that the current economic condition of their family is better 
and those who plan to make improvements in the business are more likely to invest and they also invest 
larger amounts. Those microentrepreneurs and farmers reporting better economic conditions were 9.8 and 
9.7 percentage points, respectively, more likely to invest in fixed assets. In the case of land purchases, the 
estimated effect is smaller (2.3 percentage points). 
Higher entrepreneurial ability is positively correlated with investment. Although those 
microentrepreneurs that worked in the United States are not more likely to invest, when they do, they 
invest larger amounts. Previous labor market experience and taking preliminary steps before starting a 
business influence both the decision to invest and the amount invested of microentrepreneurs. 
Interestingly, microentrepreneurs who participated in training are significantly more likely to invest and 
they invest larger amounts. This could indicate a positive effect of training on the productivity and growth 
potential of the business. However, this could also proxy for unobserved entrepreneurial ability: better 
entrepreneurs are more likely to participate in training and more likely to invest. Therefore, the result 
could not unambiguously be taken as a benefit of training, but at least it is suggestive of the positive 
effects. In the case of farmers, having previous labor market experience would increase the likelihood of 
acquiring fixed assets but not in purchasing land. The other variables capturing entrepreneurial ability are 
not statistically significant. 
Household indicators of availability of funds are positively correlated with investment decision and 
amount invested. For example, microentrepreneurs that receive remittances (from inside or outside of the 25 
 
country) are 7.4 percentage points more likely to invest, but they are not more likely to have higher I/K 
ratios. Although receiving remittances does not influence investment decisions among farmers, those 
farmers who obtain PROCAMPO transfers are more likely to invest in fixed assets but not in land. 
PROCAMPO transfers do not increase the I/K ratio of fixed assets or land. Microentrepreneurs living in 
wealthy households, proxied by the number of household items, tend to invest more. 
Having formal or informal savings is strongly associated with the incidence and size of investment. We 
find that having informal savings is a significant predictor of the decision to invest for both farmers and 
microentrepreneurs. For example, the likelihood of investing in fixed assets would increase by 7.2 
percentage points for individual entrepreneurs with informal savings, and by 3.3 percentage points in the 
case of land purchases among farmers. The I/K ratio would increase 2.7 percentage points for 
microentrepreneurs with informal savings, but not for farmers. Only for farmers, we find that having 
formal savings is associated with investment. Indeed, the probability of investing in fixed assets and land, 
respectively, would be almost 17.5 and 10.9 percentage points higher for farmers with formal savings. 
The I/K ratio is also higher for farmers with formal savings. 
Economic sector and variables related to economic conditions have an effect on the decision to invest and 
amount invested. Microenterprises operating in the commerce sector are less likely to invest but those in 
the construction sector present a higher incidence of investment. These results are plausible as commerce 
business is not capital intensive ( it does not require much machinery and equipment to operate), while 
construction business is very capital intensive. However, the economic sector of activity of farmers does 
not influence investment decisions. Microentrepreneurs and farmers living in more agrarian 
municipalities are more likely to invest and will invest higher amounts. In terms of regional differences, 
microentrepreneurs located in the Center region are less likely to invest but farmers in the South & 
Southeast region tend to invest more than those in the rest of the country. 
We discuss the effect of access to finance on investment of farmers and microenterprises in a separate 
section below. 
7.2 Enterprises 
In the case of firms, the financial sector literature has extensively studied the effects of financing 
constraints on investment using two main modeling choices.
30 The first approach examines whether 
investment is sensitive to firms’ cash flows using Tobin’s Q framework. Fazarri and others (1988) found 
that for a sample of a priori constrained firms, investment is more sensitive to firms’ cash flows than for 
their unconstrained counterparts. The authors argued that this finding confirmed their a priori 
classification of firms as financially constrained. The intuition behind this model is simple. Firms with 
good investment opportunities, proxied by the ratio of market value of the firm to its book value (Tobin’s 
Q), and that cannot easily access external financial markets, will only be able to invest using internally 
generated funds. Thus, investment for those firms will fluctuate with their cash flows. A less structural 
version of this model, dubbed the accelerator model, uses growth rate of sales as a proxy of investment 
opportunities. Using the accelerator model, Bond and others (1997) find that investment is sensitive to 
sales growth, indicating credit constraints. 
                                                      
30 Hubbard (1998) and Schiantarelli (1996) present a comprehensive review of the literature on investment and financing 
constraints. The investment literature uses term financing constraints rather than credit constraints. The financing constraints 
term is conceptual more general as it extends to both debt and equity constraints. Basically if the firm is constrained in any type 
of external financing (whether debt or public equity), it is referred to as financially constrained.   26 
 
A second type of popular model examining investment and financing constraints uses a Euler equation 
model of investment.
31 Instead of relying on Tobin’s Q, the Euler model specifies an intertemporal 
investment choice model with proxies for growth opportunities (such as indicators of the marginal 
product of capital) and financing constraints (such as indicators of internally generated funds). Using this 
type of model to study investment in U.S. agriculture, Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) find evidence of 
financing constraints. Love (2003) applied the Euler equation model to cross-country data and found that 
in countries with lower levels of financial development the intertemporal investment choice is adversely 
affected by the presence of financing constraints. 
For registered enterprises we estimate the accelerator model of investment (see, for example, Bond and 
others, 1997, and Gelos and Werner, 1999, for recent applications of this model). In this model the growth 
rate of sales serves as a proxy for the investment opportunities. We can estimate a more structural model 
of investment than the one we used for the household sample because the survey has two years of balance 
sheet data, allowing us to calculate the ratio of investment to capital for two consecutive years and the 
sales growth. We estimate the following equations:  
i i i t i t i e X FINANCE SALES K I               1 , 1 1 , 1 /   invest)     1   invest,   no (0 Pr    Invest       (5)  
i i i t i t i t i e X FINANCE SALES K I K I            1 , 1 1 , 1 , / / ) 6 (  
where: I/K is investment scaled by the capital stock (time t is 2001 and time t-1 is 2000),  SALES  is 
growth rate in sales (between 2000 and 2001), FINANCE is the indicator of access, and X is a vector of 
additional firm characteristics that could help capture the firm-specific levels of investment such as 
location (region) and industry dummies, and total size of the business (measured by the log of total 
assets).  
The dependent variable is the ratio of investment to capital stock. The model contains a lagged investment 
to capital term to capture persistence in investment and gradual adjustment of investment to its optimal 
level due to adjustment costs. The sales growth is the main proxy for the growth opportunities on the 
premise that past growth is the best predictor of the future growth (this would be the case if the shocks to 
growth opportunities are serially correlated and if the adjustment of investment takes time). We also 
control for the sector and the size as most likely additional determinants of the growth opportunities. 
Given the small number of observations we estimate the regressions for agricultural and nonagricultural 
enterprises altogether but include the indicator for agricultural enterprises (Agro dummy). 
Finally, we study the effects that access to loans has on investment (FINANCE). As in the case of 
individuals, we include dummies for whether enterprises have received a formal or informal loan during 
that period to see whether those who received loans have more investment. In addition, we include one 
dummy variable if enterprises are credit constrained from either formal or informal lenders (demand but 
not applied or rejected). 
Tables 9a and 9b present the partial derivatives (at mean values) from the estimation of equations (5) and 
(6) to analyze the investment behavior of enterprises, respectively. Table 9b presents the partial 
derivatives of the I/K ratio conditional on positive values. To evaluate whether the investment behavior of 
agricultural enterprises is related to their access to loans or the incidence of credit constraints, we interact 
the FINANCE variables with the dummy variable for the agricultural sector (Agro dummy). In Model 1 
                                                      
31 This model is also reviewed by Hubbard (1998).  27 
 
we interact the credit constrained dummy with the Agro dummy while in Model 2 we combine access to 
formal and informal loans into a single dummy variable. In Models 3 and 4 we interact the access 
variables (receiving loans) with the Agro dummy variable. 
As an additional test of credit constraints, we look at the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. This test 
has been widely used in the investment literature, starting with the pioneering paper by Fazzari and others 
(1988). The intuition behind this test is simple: in the absence of credit market imperfections the only 
determinant of investment should be the growth opportunities (proxied here by the sales growth). The 
reason is that in the market without imperfections a firm with good growth prospects should be able to 
raise sufficient external funds to invest in its growth opportunity. However, if access to credit is 
imperfect, the firms will be more likely to invest when they have high cash flows. In other words, the 
availability of internal funds will be a predictor of investment behavior and the sensitivity of investment 
to availability of internal funds (proxied by the cash flows) is a measure of financing constraints. The 
model is given by the same equation as above, but instead of access indicators we substitute the cash 
flows (scaled by total assets). Finding a positive coefficient on cash flow suggests that firms invest more 
when they have more internal funds and is indicative of credit constraints. Model 5 in Tables 9a and 9b 
interact the Agro dummy with the cash flow variable.  
Mexican enterprises behave as predicted by the theoretical and empirical literature. The regression results 
show that both the decision to invest and the investment to asset ratio are positive and strongly associated 
with the lagged I/K and sales growth for various specifications. Furthermore, we find evidence that larger 
enterprises (proxied by total assets) are more likely to invest, as well as to have higher I/K ratios. 
Economic sector influences the I/K ratio but not the likelihood of investing. For agricultural and 
manufacturing enterprises, their I/K ratio will be 1.7 and 2.9 percentage points lower, respectively. In 
terms of regional differences, enterprises located in the Center-west region tend to invest more as well as 
to show larger I/K ratios. Those enterprises located in the Center region are less likely to invest but their 
I/K ratio is not different from their counterparts in other regions. 
In contrast with the findings of section 6.2, agricultural enterprises appear more credit constrained than 
their nonagricultural counterparts. The regression results show that the I/K ratio is sensitive to cash flow 
only for agricultural enterprises, providing some empirical evidence that agricultural enterprises are more 
credit constrained. The estimated effect is that the I/K ratio would increase 3.8 percentage points for every 
additional peso of cash flow of agricultural enterprises, but there is not a statistically significant effect for 
enterprises in other economic sectors. 
7.3 Does participation in loan markets affect investment behavior? 
One of the most important policy and research questions regarding credit markets is whether improved 
access to credit would result in positive changes in investment outcomes. This quantification of impact is 
important to guide policy discussion on the allocation of public finds and to highlight complementarities 
of interventions on various fronts. To study the effects that access to finance and credit constraints have 
on investment, the investment equations discussed previously included a set of dummy variables. These 
variables identify individual entrepreneurs or enterprises that received formal loans only or in 
combination with informal loans, received informal loans only, and that are credit constrained from either 
formal or informal lenders.
32 Thus, we can distinguish their investment pattern from those individual 
                                                      
32 As presented in Section 4, the percentage of individual entrepreneurs or enterprises borrowing from both formal and informal 
lenders is very small. We created mutually exclusive categories for clarity purposes. 28 
 
entrepreneurs or enterprises without a demand for loans. An examination of those variables provides a 
first attempt to measure the effect of credit constraints on investment behavior. 
The findings presented below should be interpreted with caution because of the problem of self-selection 
into participating in loan markets. Although we may find a positive correlation between participation in 
loan markets and investment behavior, the coefficient may not necessarily show the impact of access to 
finance: those individual entrepreneurs borrowing from formal or informal lenders may be more likely to 
invest whether or not they receive loans. It is likely that the factors affecting the decision to invest would 
also influence the decision to borrow. In this context, the estimated coefficients would overestimate the 
effect of receiving formal or informal loans on investment. Nonetheless, if we find that the participation 
coefficients are not significant, this means that there is no association between borrowing and investment 
behavior. 
The empirical results presented in Tables 8a through 8c show that microentrepreneurs and farmers 
receiving informal loans are more likely to invest and would have higher I/K ratios, but farmers would not 
necessarily buy more land. For the average microentrepreneur, the probability of investing and the I/K 
ratio would be 11.8 and 3.6 percentage points higher for those borrowing from any lender, respectively 
(Model 2). In the case of farmers, the estimated effects are substantially lower, the propensity to invest in 
assets and the I/K ratio will increase 7.5 and 2.4 percentage points, respectively (Table 8b, Model 2). 
Credit-constrained individual entrepreneurs do not have a different investment behavior than their 
counterparts without a demand for loans. Lastly, investments in land are not related with borrowing from 
formal or informal lenders. 
For enterprises, the regression results presented in Tables 9a and 9b show that the incidence of investment 
is higher for those borrowing from formal lenders. The partial derivatives results show that enterprises 
borrowing from formal lenders are 6.4 percentage points more likely to invest (Model 1), consistent with 
the findings presented in Table 3c. Furthermore, we find that agricultural and nonagricultural enterprises 
present a similar incidence of investment regardless of their borrowing status. Credit-constrained 
enterprises are not more likely to invest. 
Nonetheless, we find that the I/K ratio is about 2–3 percentage points higher for enterprises borrowing 
from formal or informal lenders and that are credit constrained. Because those enterprises report having a 
demand for loans, it is not surprising to find that their I/K ratio is larger. Agricultural enterprises that are 
credit constrained present a lower I/K ratio (significant only at 15 percent) than their nonagricultural 
counterparts (Model 1 and Model 2). When examining whether borrowing from formal or informal 
lenders affects differently agricultural and nonagricultural enterprises, we find that only agricultural 
enterprises borrowing from informal lenders (Model 3) or from any lender (Model 4) will show a higher 
I/K ratio (significant only at 15 percent). 
In contrast with the findings of Section 7, agricultural enterprises appear more credit constrained than 
their nonagricultural counterparts. The regression results show that the I/K ratio is sensitive to cash flow 
only for agricultural enterprises, providing some empirical evidence that agricultural enterprises are 
somehow credit constrained. The estimated effect is that the I/K ratio would increase 3.8 percentage 
points for every additional peso of cash flow of agricultural enterprises, but there is not a statistically 
significant effect for enterprises in other economic sectors. 
We use the empirical results presented in Tables 8a through 9b to estimate the effect of offering formal or 
informal loans to credit-constrained individual entrepreneurs or enterprises. We find that removing credit 
constraints would have its largest effect on the number of individual entrepreneurs that invest and on the 
I/K level of enterprises. To estimate the effect of removing credit constraints on investment behavior, we 29 
 
use regression coefficients to estimate the effect of offering formal or informal loans to the average 
individual or enterprise assuming that they are credit constrained. We evaluate the partial derivatives at 
the mean values of all variables but the FINANCE variables and present the results in Table 10. Table 10 
illustrates that excluding microentrepreneurs, the estimated effect of removing credit constraints on the 
incidence of investment is slightly higher for formal loans than for informal loans. Furthermore, the 
estimated impact is higher for individual entrepreneurs than for enterprises. Regarding the I/K ratio, 
offering formal or informal loans would result in a small increase. Had there been no credit constraints 
during the period covered by the surveys, the percentage of microentrepreneurs and farmers making 
investments would have been about 31 and 35 percent higher, respectively. The estimated effects on the 
I/K are smaller: 10 percent for microentrepreneurs and about 8 percent for farmers. In the case of 
enterprises, the estimated effects are more modest as the incidence of credit constraints is lower than for 
individual entrepreneurs. Removing credit constraints for enterprises would result in 3-9 percent increase 
in the number of enterprises investing and in 4-19 percent higher I/K ratio. 
8.  Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we provide new evidence about the extent of credit constraints and whether credit 
constraints affect investment decisions. We find that the low participation rates in loan markets are 
partially attributed to a weak demand for loans. The empirical findings of the survey data dispute the 
commonly held belief that low participation rates in loan markets result from an insufficient supply of 
loans. About 53 percent of microentrepreneurs, 57 percent of farmers, 49 percent of nonagricultural 
enterprises, and 61 percent of agricultural enterprises present a self-reported demand for loans. The 
proportion of agents demanding formal loans is higher than the fraction demanding informal loans for all 
but microentrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, the incidence of credit constraints is pervasive across Mexico, especially among individual 
entrepreneurs. We find that about 37 percent of microentrepreneurs, 41 percent of farmers, 19 percent of 
nonagricultural enterprises, and 21 percent of agricultural enterprises are credit constrained from both 
formal and informal lenders. The incidence of credit constraints is higher for formal lenders than for 
informal lenders among individual entrepreneurs. In contrast, for enterprises, the degree of credit 
constraints is slightly higher for informal than for formal lenders.
 33 
Credit-constrained agents have an unmet demand for loans because the loan contracts offered by formal 
and informal lenders do not match their needs and because of self-selection out of credit markets because 
of the process involved in obtaining loans. 
We find that the market penetration of formal and informal lenders in loan markets is in a dire state, 
especially for farmers and microentrepreneurs. For example, private banks reach about 2 percent of 
individual entrepreneurs demanding bank loans and 44 percent of nonagricultural enterprises and 46 
percent of agricultural ones. Compared to private banks, the outreach of development banks is a bit higher 
for farmers (4 percent) but substantially higher for enterprises (11 percent). Unregulated nonbank 
intermediaries reach about 6-8 percent of individual entrepreneurs with a demand for loans. 
Individual entrepreneurs receiving informal loans present the following features.  Individual entrepreneurs 
receiving informal loans have previous experience as salaried workers, do not have formal savings, have 
trade credit transactions, sell their goods on credit, and reside in the South & Southeast and Center-west 
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regions. However, we observed two main differences between farmers and microentrepreneurs that 
receive informal loans: (a) formal education increases the use of informal loans for microentrepreneurs 
but decreases it use for farmers; and (b) microentrepreneurs experiencing adverse shocks are more likely 
to receive informal loans, but for farmers their access to informal is not affected by experiencing an 
adverse shock. 
In terms of receiving formal loans, we find that size indicators, such as assets and number of workers, as 
well as education attainment are not statistically significant; however registration with government 
agencies increases the use of formal loans, suggesting complementarities in participation. Farmers that are 
nonindigenous, receive training, use trade credit, are members of guilds, receive PROCAMPO benefits, 
and have irrigated land have better access to formal loans. Microentrepreneurs that have been less time in 
operations and have formal or informal savings are more likely to borrow from formal lenders. We 
observe regional differences in access to formal lenders only for microentrepreneurs; however farmers in 
urban areas (more than 50,000 inhabitants) have less access. Another interesting finding is that the 
presence of financial providers in the municipality increases the use of formal loans. This suggests that 
physical proximity may be a factor affecting the ability of entrepreneurs to interact with formal lenders, 
reducing transaction costs. When examining how entrepreneurs interact with formal lenders we find that 
it is mostly through visits. 
The profile of individual entrepreneurs demanding formal loans is broadly similar to those demanding 
informal loans, suggesting that the demand for loans is not tied to a specific provider.  Microentrepreneurs 
more likely to demand loans have worked as salaried employee, are middle-aged, have formal education, 
have formal savings, buy inputs on credit, receive remittances (informal loans only), and were affected by 
adverse events. Farmers with a higher probability of demanding loans have worked as a salaried 
employee, receive remittances, have households with more people (informal loans only), use coyotes to 
sell their products, sell outside the municipality, have formal savings (informal loans only), made sales on 
credit, buy inputs on credit, and were affected by adverse events. Individual entrepreneurs located in more 
populated and more agrarian municipalities tend to demand more loans. Lastly, we observe regional 
differences in the demand for loans. 
Overall, credit-constrained individual entrepreneurs present similar features to those demanding loans. 
Farmers more likely to be credit constrained worked as a salaried employee (formal loans only), receive 
remittances, have bigger families (informal loans only), sell their goods through coyotes, sell outside the 
municipality, have irrigated land, do not have formal savings (informal loans only), made sales on credit 
(formal loans only), were affected by adverse shocks, and plan to improve their business (formal loans 
only). Microentrepreneurs with a greater propensity to be credit constrained are female (informal loans 
only), worked as a salaried employee (formal loans only), are middle-aged (formal loans only), have 
formal education (formal loans only), do not have formal savings, made sales on credit, and were affected 
by adverse events. Consistent with the literature, we find a significant wealth effect. For example, 
individual entrepreneurs with more assets and with formal savings (financial wealth) are less likely to be 
credit constrained. 
Enterprises that have more assets, have been longer in operations, and have exporting experience are 
more likely to receive loans. Enterprises more likely to borrow from formal lenders have more assets, 
have been longer in operations, export their production, sell on credit, buy on credit, have formal savings, 
are not registered with government agencies, use the Internet for their operations, plan to improve their 
business, operated in the agricultural sector, and report problems in their operations. Enterprises with 
better access to informal lenders have managers without college education, have more employees, are 
older, are member of economic groups, buy on credit, have formal savings, do not use external auditors, 
are not registered with government agencies, and are members of private organizations (guilds). We find 31 
 
some regional differences in access to formal and informal loans. Enterprises in the South & Southeast, 
Center, and Northwest regions are more likely to receive informal loans, but they are less likely to borrow 
from formal lenders. Agricultural enterprises in urban areas (more than 50,000 inhabitants) have less 
access to formal lenders. 
Overall, the profile of enterprises’ demand for formal and informal loans is associated with the same 
characteristics. Enterprises demanding loans have less educated managers, export part of their production, 
are not registered with government authorities, buy inputs on credit, and report some problems in their 
operations. In addition to those variables, enterprises demanding formal loans have the main shareholder 
responsible for their operations, and operate in the agricultural sector. Whereas, enterprises demanding 
informal loans are older, do not have external auditors, do not train their workers, and are registered with 
private organizations. Enterprises located in the South & Southeast region are more likely to demand 
loans, but agricultural enterprises located in urban areas present lower chances of demanding loans. 
Enterprises more likely to be credit constrained: are smaller, are younger, do not have formal savings, are 
not members of economic groups, are located in states with less population working in agriculture. 
Furthermore, we find that enterprises located in the South & Southeast region have a higher probability of 
being credit constrained from formal lenders. Enterprises located in the Center, Center-west, and 
Northwest regions as well as agricultural enterprises placed in urban areas are less likely to be credit 
constrained from informal lenders. A surprising finding is that enterprises with foreign ownership and 
with a more concentrated ownership are more likely to be credit constrained from formal lenders. 
The paper answers two key questions regarding the consequences of credit constraints on investment, 
namely: Does the incidence of credit constraints reduce the number of economic agents making 
investments? And if so, how many more agents would invest and how much larger would their 
investment be in the absence of credit constraints? We present empirical evidence that credit constraints 
influence negatively the investment behavior of individual entrepreneurs and enterprises. This effect is 
particularly negative for individual entrepreneurs. This situation should be a matter of concern for 
policymakers that want to promote growth in Mexico’s rural economy. Investments are defined as 
expenditures to acquire capital goods, including buildings, equipment, tools, machinery, vehicles, and 
other capital assets. A separate analysis is carried out for the purchase of agricultural land. 
Individual entrepreneurs are less likely to make investments than enterprises. About 37 percent of 
microentrepreneurs made some type of investment during the period covered by the survey, relatively 
higher than the 27 percent of farmers that invested. In contrast, about 78-80 percent of enterprises made 
investments. This reflects that individual entrepreneurs are more likely to be credit constrained and that 
farmers are more credit constrained than microentrepreneurs (see section 6 above). Only 4 percent of 
farmers purchased agricultural land, indicating that land markets are not very active in the rural economy. 
The actual amounts invested were small relative to the total business assets of individual entrepreneurs 
and enterprises (I/K ratio). The median value of I/K is about 10-13 percent for individual entrepreneurs 
and slightly higher for enterprises (15-17 percent). In the case of land purchases made by farmers, the I/K 
ratio is substantially higher, reaching 48 percent. This could be because newly purchased land has a 
higher value than existing land holdings.
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Economic agents more likely to invest and to have higher I/K ratio present the following features: For 
individual entrepreneurs: worked as salaried employee, have more assets, hire workers, are younger, have 
formal savings (farmers only), have informal savings, have improved economic conditions in their 
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households, plan to improve their businesses (microentrepreneurs only), do not operate in commerce 
(microentrepreneurs only), receive PROCAMPO transfers (farmers only), receive remittances 
(microentrepreneurs only), and are located in more agrarian municipalities. Microentrepreneurs with 
younger operations invest more but farmers with older operations invest more. Farmers that invested in 
land have formal and informal deposits/savings, improved the economic conditions of their households, 
and have younger operations. For enterprises: have higher values of lagged I/K, stronger sales growth, 
and have more assets. Agricultural and manufacturing enterprises have lower I/K ratios. 
The low use of loans has consequences for the amount of investment that occurs in the rural economy, 
posing a major obstacle to Mexico’s convergence toward its NAFTA partners. The empirical analysis, 
which includes proxies of business prospects and creditworthiness, shows that removing credit constraints 
would have its largest effect on the number of individual entrepreneurs that invest and on the I/K level of 
enterprises. From a policy perspective, the trick is to increase the level of prudent lending for a given 
level of risk-adjusted interest rate and per capita income. Had there been no credit constraints during the 
period covered by the surveys, the percentage of microentrepreneurs and farmers making investments 
would have been about 31 and 35 percent higher, respectively. The estimated effects on the I/K are 
smaller: 10 percent for microentrepreneurs and about 8 percent for farmers. In the case of enterprises, the 
estimated effects are more modest as the incidence of credit constraints is lower than for individual 
entrepreneurs. Removing credit constraints for enterprises would result in 3-9 percent increase in the 
number of enterprises investing and in 4-19 percent higher I/K ratio. 33 
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Table 1: Household and enterprise surveys: sample characteristics and results
(number of observations) Total Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5
Southeast Center Center-west Northwest Northeast
Microenterprises 3,301 966 912 662 396 365
Farmers 1,825 601 598 384 113 129
Agricultural enterprises 954 163 259 189 165 178
   < 2,500 inhabitants 75 35 0 10 23 7
   2,500 - 50,000 inhabitants 261 67 56 49 51 38
   > 50,000 inhabitants 618 61 203 130 91 133
Nonagricultural enterprises 1,073 171 391 242 114 155
   < 2,500 inhabitants 334 38 95 111 32 58
   2,500 -  50,000 inhabitants 739 133 296 131 82 97
Agricultural enterprises 17,226 2,935 4,472 4,917 2,211 2,691
   < 2,500 inhabitants 75 35 0 10 23 7
   2,500 - 50,000 inhabitants 5,193 1,530 987 1,512 732 432
   > 50,000 inhabitants 11,958 1,370 3,485 3,395 1,456 2,252
Nonagricultural enterprises 30,209 8,242 7,715 8,492 2,710 3,050
   < 2,500 inhabitants 343 38 95 111 35 64
   2,500 -  50,000 inhabitants 29,866 8,204 7,620 8,381 2,675 2,986
Source:  Authors' calculations based on data from the 2002 Household and Enterprise surveys.
Panel A.  Household survey





Table 2:  Classification of lenders
Formal lenders Informal lenders
Private banks Moneylenders
Development banks (first-tier) Friends and relatives
Regulated nonbanks Input supplier
    Investment houses (SOFOLES) Clients
    Factoring companies Partners and/or shareholders (enterprises only
    Leasing companies Other informal providers
    Savings and credit institutions
           Credit unions (UCs)      
           Savings and loan societies (SAPs)      
Unregulated nonbanks      
    Savings and credit institutions
         Credit cooperatives      
         Civil associations      
         Cajas de ahorro      
    Government programs      
    Other institutions        37 
 
 
Table 3a:  Participation in loan markets




   All loans 47.1 36.8 16.1 100.0
   Formal loans 52.7 42.0 5.2 100.0
   Informal loans 52.9 35.4 11.6 100.0
Farmers
   All loans 43.4 41.2 15.4 100.0
   Formal loans 46.6 47.5 5.9 100.0
   Informal loans 50.0 40.3 9.8 100.0
Nonagricultural enterprises
   All loans 51.0 18.7 30.3 100.0
   Formal loans 55.8 23.3 20.9 100.0
   Informal loans 62.8 24.4 12.8 100.0
Agricultural enterprises
   All loans 39.4 21.4 39.2 100.0
   Formal loans 44.9 26.5 28.6 100.0
   Informal loans 55.9 29.6 14.6 100.0
Source:  Authors' calculations based on data from the 2002 Household and Enterprise surveys.  38 
 
Table 3b:  Participation in loan markets









(a) (a)  (a) (b)  (a) (c) (c)
All loans 47.1 35.9 0.9 5.0 16.1 91.7 3.4
Formal loans 52.7 41.2 0.9 14.3 5.2 87.5 6.5
Commercial banks 58.2 40.6 0.4 33.3 0.8 87.5 4.2
Development banks 57.2 42.4 0.1 15.4 0.3 63.6 9.1
Regulated nonbanks 56.6 41.7 0.2 11.3 1.5 46.8 4.3
Unregulated nonbanks 56.4 39.8 0.3 7.4 3.5 87.5 6.3
Informal loans 52.9 35.3 0.2 1.6 11.6 93.3 1.9
Friends and relatives 60.7 29.0 0.1 0.9 10.2 91.7 2.1
Other informal lenders 58.3 39.7 0.1 4.6 2.0 90.3 0.0
All loans 43.4 40.3 0.9 5.7 15.4 92.2 3.6
Formal loans 46.6 46.3 1.2 16.3 5.9 87.0 7.4
Commercial banks 53.5 45.3 0.4 33.3 0.8 78.6 0.0
Development banks 51.5 46.4 0.4 20.0 1.8 78.1 9.4
Regulated nonbanks 51.8 47.3 0.2 18.8 0.7 76.9 3.4
Unregulated nonbanks 51.0 45.5 0.4 12.3 3.1 89.5 3.4
Informal loans 50.0 40.2 0.1 1.1 9.8 94.9 1.1
Friends and relatives 59.5 32.2 0.1 0.7 8.3 92.1 3.4
Other informal lenders 53.1 45.1 0.1 3.0 1.8 96.9 0.0
All loans 51.0 17.3 1.4 4.4 30.3 94.8 4.0
Formal 55.8 21.5 1.8 7.8 20.9 92.0 5.4
Commercial banks 62.7 19.2 1.9 10.3 16.2 90.8 6.3
Development banks 66.4 29.5 0.4 8.9 3.8 85.4 7.3
Regulated nonbanks 66.8 30.8 0.0 0.0 2.3 100.0 0.0
Unregulated nonbanks 66.9 32.2 0.2 22.2 0.7 100.0 0.0
Informal 62.8 24.4 0.0 0.0 12.8 95.6 0.7
Partners or shareholders 66.1 25.3 0.0 0.0 8.6 94.6 0.0
Other informal lenders 67.6 27.7 0.0 0.0 4.8 94.1 2.0
All loans 39.4 19.9 1.5 3.6 39.2 94.1 4.5
Formal 44.9 24.6 1.9 6.2 28.6 91.9 5.5
Commercial banks 52.2 24.9 0.8 3.7 22.0 92.9 4.3
Development banks 58.7 35.6 0.7 13.0 4.9 91.5 6.4
Regulated nonbanks 60.4 38.1 0.0 0.0 1.6 93.3 0.0
Unregulated nonbanks 59.9 36.7 0.6 18.2 2.8 74.1 11.1
Informal 55.9 29.5 0.1 0.7 14.6 95.0 1.4
Partners or shareholders 61.8 32.9 0.0 0.0 5.2 92.0 0.0
Other informal lenders 59.0 30.8 0.1 1.0 10.1 94.8 2.1
a.  Percent of total number of observations.
b. Percent of total number of loan applicants. 
c.  Percent of total number of borrowers.
Note: Because of missing values the sum of columns (4a) and (4b) may not add to 100. 





Panel A. Microentrepreneurs 
Panel B. Farmers
Panel C. Nonagricultural enterprises
Panel D. Agricultural enterprises39 
 
 
Table 3c:   Market penetration by type of lender





Private banks 1.8 1.7 43.5 46.1
Development banks 0.8 3.6 11.4 11.9
Regulated nonbanks 3.4 1.5 7.0 4.0
Unregulated nonbank 8.1 6.4 2.0 7.0
Friends & relatives 26.1 20.4 n.a. n.a.
Shareholders n.a. n.a. 25.3 13.7
Other informal lender 4.7 3.7 14.7 24.6
n.a.: not applicable.
Source:  Authors' calculations based on data from the 2002 Household and Enterprise surveys.  
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Credit constrained agent 38.4 36.8 41.2 20.0 18.7 21.4
Reasons for being credit constrained a/
Rejected 2.3 2.3 2.3 7.2 7.5 6.9
Did not request loans bcse of:
   Doesn't know how to apply 26.7 25.8 28.3 18.1 18.3 17.9
   Think it will be rejected 25.2 25.9 24.1 22.1 16.1 27.9
   Inadequate amounts and maturity 41.5 42.1 40.6 9.3 9.1 9.5
   High interest rates and fees 1.5 1.3 1.9 23.1 23.7 22.6
   High transactions costs 34.5 33.2 36.7 18.9 15.1 22.6
   Too risky 15.8 14.9 17.1 9.3 5.4 13.2
   Other reasons 8.0 8.6 7.0 38.6 44.1 33.2
Credit constrained 44.0 42.1 47.5 24.8 23.3 26.5
Reasons for being credit constrained a/
Rejected 2.2 2.1 2.4 7.4 7.6 7.1
Did not request loans bcse of:
   Doesn't know how to apply 25.8 25.1 27.0 17.2 16.9 17.4
   Think it will be rejected 24.8 25.7 23.4 20.0 13.9 26.0
   Inadequate amounts and maturity 33.6 34.9 31.5 7.3 7.4 7.2
   High interest rates and fees 0.7 0.8 0.6 21.7 22.1 21.3
   High transactions costs 30.8 29.6 32.7 18.2 14.7 21.7
   Too risky 11.3 10.9 11.9 7.1 4.3 9.8
   Other reasons 8.4 7.8 9.4 40.6 46.3 34.9
Credit constrained 37.2 35.4 40.3 26.8 24.4 29.6
Reasons for being credit constrained a/
Rejected 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.4
Did not request loans bcse of:
   Doesn't know how to apply 13.5 14.0 12.6 9.9 10.3 9.6
   Think it will be rejected 18.0 19.3 16.1 12.3 6.9 17.4
   Inadequate amounts and maturity 36.0 36.7 35.1 4.1 4.2 3.9
   High interest rates and fees 1.2 0.8 1.8 10.3 11.1 9.6
   High transactions costs 16.2 15.7 17.1 5.9 5.3 6.4
   Too risky 15.1 14.3 16.4 4.2 3.1 5.3
   Other reasons 9.8 9.0 10.9 57.6 62.2 53.4
a. Multiple responses allowed.  Percent of those being credit constrained
Source:  Authors' calculations based on data from the 2002 Household and Enterprise surveys.
Panel B. Formal loans
Panel C. Informal loans
Enterprises Individual entrepreneurs






Table 5:  Demand identification variables
(mean values of each column heading)
No 
demand
Demand T-test No 
demand
Demand T-test No 
demand




No. observations 1701 1524 1700 1511 851 974 912 913
Entrepreneurial abilities
Preliminary steps (d) 0.46 0.54 *** 0.46 0.54 *** 0.31 0.39 *** 0.31 0.39 ***
Inherited a business (farm) (d) 0.13 0.13 NS 0.13 0.12 NS 0.60 0.61 NS 0.60 0.61 NS
Need for funds
Death or illness (d) 0.06 0.10 *** 0.07 0.10 *** 0.07 0.10 ** 0.06 0.11 ***
Loss of income (d) 0.06 0.10 *** 0.06 0.11 *** 0.13 0.16 * 0.14 0.15 NS
Affected by adverse weather (d) 0.08 0.13 *** 0.09 0.13 *** 0.27 0.38 *** 0.27 0.39 ***
Present economic situation of the family is better (d) 0.31 0.30 NS 0.30 0.31 NS 0.22 0.20 NS 0.22 0.20 NS
Expansion prospects
Plans to make improvements in business (d) 0.44 0.48 *** 0.44 0.48 ** 0.26 0.37 *** 0.27 0.37 ***
Did not purchase asset b/c - no need (d) 0.39 0.30 *** 0.40 0.28 *** 0.28 0.25 * 0.29 0.24 ***
Wealth
Purchased house with own resources (d) 0.64 0.61 ** 0.65 0.60 *** 0.65 0.67 NS 0.65 0.67 NS
Personal savings to start the business (d) 0.57 0.50 *** 0.57 0.50 ***
Panel A.  Enterprises
No. observations 599 474 674 399 428 526 533 421
Need for funds
Clients paying late - (d) 0.19 0.22 NS 0.19 0.23 ** 0.16 0.17 NS 0.18 0.15 NS
Problem: reduction in internal resources in 2001 0.19 0.26 *** 0.19 0.27 *** 0.22 0.32 *** 0.24 0.32 ***
Problem: delay in credit payments to clients in 2001 0.15 0.22 *** 0.16 0.22 *** 0.16 0.16 NS 0.17 0.15 NS
Expansion prospects
Plans to make improvements in business 0.72 0.81 *** 0.74 0.79 ** 0.71 0.77 ** 0.74 0.76 NS
No problem to commercialize 0.31 0.21 *** 0.29 0.22 *** 0.27 0.16 *** 0.24 0.16 ***
Wealth
Finance came from own resources (>50%) 0.87 0.85 NS 0.86 0.87 NS 0.88 0.80 *** 0.89 0.77 ***
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d) dummy variable.
Source:  Authors' calculations based on data from the 2002 Household and Enterprise surveys.









Table 6a:  Microentrepreneurs—partial derivatives of participation outcomes in formal loan markets
(derived from Heckman probit estimates) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability 0.525 0.456 0.018
Household  characteristics
Number of people in the household 0.005 [0.248] -0.004 [0.352] -0.001 [0.311] 4.864
Received remittances (d) -0.031 [0.338] 0.023 [0.452] 0.007 [0.408] 0.114
Personal  characteristics
Male (d) 0.018 [0.463] -0.026 [0.289] 0.008 [0.120] 0.647
Speak indigenous language (d) -0.050 [0.134] 0.033 [0.337] 0.017 [0.207] 0.118
Worked as salaried worker (d) -0.055** [0.013] 0.056** [0.010] -0.001 [0.813] 0.641
Age  (years) -0.016*** [0.002] 0.012** [0.015] 0.003*** [0.006] 43.480
Age squared/100 0.016*** [0.003] -0.013** [0.017] -0.003** [0.013] 20.458
Primary - (d) -0.097*** [0.004] 0.096*** [0.003] 0.001 [0.944] 0.482
Secondary - (d) -0.064 [0.113] 0.065 [0.104] -0.001 [0.919] 0.215
More than secondary - (d) -0.040 [0.361] 0.048 [0.269] -0.008 [0.359] 0.186
Business characteristics
No workers hired in 2001 (d) 0.002 [0.941] 0.004 [0.856] -0.006 [0.320] 0.631
Sells outside municipality (d) 0.027 [0.250] -0.020 [0.401] -0.008 [0.120] 0.283
Productive assets (log) 0.006 [0.174] -0.008* [0.087] 0.002 [0.226] 9.295
Age of business (log) 0.011 [0.324] 0.001 [0.923] -0.012*** [0.000] 1.948
Manufacturing (d) -0.037 [0.165] 0.014 [0.594] 0.023** [0.011] 0.270
Commerce (d) 0.027 [0.315] -0.029 [0.282] 0.001 [0.823] 0.367
Owner/worker received training (d) -0.042 [0.323] 0.045 [0.284] -0.003 [0.706] 0.066
Has formal savings  (d) -0.023 [0.482] -0.053 [0.110] 0.076*** [0.000] 0.116
Has informal savings - tandas  (d) -0.070*** [0.005] 0.049** [0.044] 0.021*** [0.006] 0.223
Made sales on credit (d) 0.050** [0.046] -0.054** [0.029] 0.004 [0.518] 0.223
Bought inputs on credit (d) -0.047 [0.120] 0.053* [0.074] -0.006 [0.236] 0.149
Registration with any govmnt - (d) 0.014 [0.560] -0.025 [0.294] 0.011 [0.103] 0.416
Member in guilds (d) -0.026 [0.432] 0.020 [0.537] 0.006 [0.469] 0.114
Regional characteristics
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) 0.040 [0.308] -0.048 [0.223] 0.007 [0.470] 0.295
Region 2: Center (d) 0.230*** [0.000] -0.216*** [0.000] -0.014* [0.058] 0.296
Region 3: Center-west (d) 0.081** [0.037] -0.115*** [0.002] 0.034** [0.027] 0.191
Region 4: Northwest (d) 0.183*** [0.000] -0.179*** [0.000] -0.003 [0.707] 0.120
Population in municipality (log) 0.018* [0.076] -0.020** [0.042] 0.002 [0.413] 10.554
Population employed in agricultural sector in 
municipality (%)
0.160** [0.011] -0.146** [0.019] -0.014 [0.422] 0.234
Number of types of providers of financial services 
in locality
0.000 [0.986] -0.003 [0.594] 0.003** [0.020] 2.267
Demand identification
Preliminary steps to start a business - (d) -0.029 [0.167] 0.026 [0.172] 0.002 [0.254] 0.500
Death or illness - (d) -0.107*** [0.005] 0.098*** [0.002] 0.009 [0.321] 0.085
Loss of income - (d) -0.091** [0.030] 0.084** [0.043] 0.008 [0.119] 0.078
Purchased house with own resources (d) 0.017 [0.415] -0.015 [0.416] -0.001 [0.455] 0.629
Inherited a business (d) -0.002 [0.949] 0.002 [0.949] 0.000 [0.949] 0.133
Present economic situation of the family is better -  0.019 [0.388] -0.017 [0.387] -0.001 [0.461] 0.299
Did not purchase asset b/c of no need - (d) 0.078*** [0.000] -0.072*** [0.001] -0.006* [0.078] 0.345
Plans to make improvements in business - (d) -0.010 [0.610] 0.010 [0.608] 0.001 [0.649] 0.461
Affected by climatic events (d) -0.075** [0.022] 0.069** [0.020] 0.006 [0.283] 0.106
Robust p values in brackets.
Number of observations: 2,817.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
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Table 6b:  Microentrepreneurs—partial derivatives of participation outcomes in informal loan markets
(derived from Heckman probit estimates) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability 0.534 0.393 0.072
Household  characteristics
Number of people in the household 0.004 [0.360] -0.004 [0.424] -0.001 [0.825] 4.864
Received remittances (d) -0.062** [0.047] 0.009 [0.762] 0.053** [0.011] 0.114
Personal  characteristics
Male (d) 0.037 [0.141] -0.048** [0.048] 0.011 [0.391] 0.647
Speak indigenous language (d) -0.024 [0.475] 0.036 [0.279] -0.012 [0.495] 0.118
Worked as salaried worker (d) -0.056** [0.011] 0.031 [0.153] 0.025** [0.040] 0.641
Age  (years) -0.011** [0.027] 0.003 [0.556] 0.008*** [0.005] 43.480
Age squared/100 0.012** [0.025] -0.001 [0.861] -0.011*** [0.001] 20.458
Primary - (d) -0.091*** [0.006] 0.034 [0.338] 0.057** [0.010] 0.482
Secondary - (d) -0.059 [0.139] 0.000 [0.998] 0.059** [0.045] 0.215
More than secondary - (d) -0.080* [0.065] 0.000 [0.994] 0.079** [0.017] 0.186
Business characteristics
No workers hired in 2001 (d) 0.003 [0.874] -0.004 [0.838] 0.001 [0.944] 0.631
Sells outside municipality (d) 0.002 [0.929] -0.009 [0.708] 0.006 [0.618] 0.283
Productive assets (log) 0.002 [0.739] -0.004 [0.398] 0.002 [0.429] 9.295
Age of business (log) 0.004 [0.685] 0.006 [0.530] -0.011* [0.075] 1.948
Manufacturing (d) -0.023 [0.394] 0.005 [0.853] 0.018 [0.235] 0.270
Commerce (d) 0.018 [0.496] -0.019 [0.461] 0.001 [0.938] 0.367
Owner/worker received training (d) -0.066 [0.123] 0.052 [0.209] 0.014 [0.567] 0.066
Has formal savings  (d) 0.095*** [0.004] -0.046 [0.141] -0.049*** [0.000] 0.116
Has informal savings - tandas  (d) -0.061** [0.014] 0.010 [0.660] 0.050*** [0.001] 0.223
Made sales on credit (d) 0.026 [0.300] -0.068*** [0.004] 0.042*** [0.009] 0.223
Bought inputs on credit (d) -0.118*** [0.000] 0.029 [0.346] 0.090*** [0.000] 0.149
Registration with any govmnt - (d) 0.035 [0.144] -0.025 [0.278] -0.010 [0.467] 0.416
Member in guilds (d) -0.019 [0.564] 0.008 [0.798] 0.011 [0.564] 0.114
Regional characteristics
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) -0.003 [0.931] -0.052 [0.181] 0.056** [0.040] 0.295
Region 2: Center (d) 0.187*** [0.000] -0.217*** [0.000] 0.029 [0.220] 0.296
Region 3: Center-west (d) 0.087** [0.026] -0.146*** [0.000] 0.059** [0.037] 0.191
Region 4: Northwest (d) 0.154*** [0.000] -0.176*** [0.000] 0.023 [0.402] 0.120
Population in municipality (log) 0.005 [0.620] -0.016 [0.108] 0.011** [0.043] 10.554
Population employed in agricultural sector in 
municipality (%)
0.158** [0.011] -0.238*** [0.000] 0.080** [0.029] 0.234
Number of types of providers of financial services 
in locality
0.009 [0.125] -0.007 [0.182] -0.001 [0.693] 2.267
Demand identification
Preliminary steps to start a business - (d) -0.031* [0.086] 0.016* [0.080] 0.015 [0.167] 0.500
Death or illness - (d) -0.088*** [0.004] 0.039* [0.052] 0.050** [0.036] 0.085
Loss of income - (d) -0.126*** [0.000] 0.051* [0.091] 0.075*** [0.002] 0.078
Purchased house with own resources (d) 0.023 [0.217] -0.011 [0.290] -0.011 [0.194] 0.629
Inherited a business (d) 0.006 [0.827] -0.003 [0.829] -0.003 [0.826] 0.133
Present economic situation of the family is better -  -0.003 [0.857] 0.002 [0.855] 0.002 [0.860] 0.299
Did not purchase asset b/c of no need - (d) 0.101*** [0.000] -0.054** [0.011] -0.047*** [0.000] 0.345
Plans to make improvements in business - (d) 0.011 [0.557] -0.005 [0.581] -0.005 [0.542] 0.461
Affected by climatic events (d) -0.029 [0.318] 0.014 [0.355] 0.015 [0.323] 0.106
Robust p values in brackets.
Number of observations: 2,817.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note:In the case of dummy variables represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
Region 5 is the omitted category in this regression.
Mean 





Table 6c:  Farmers—partial derivatives of participation outcomes in formal loan markets
(derived from Heckman probit estimates) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability 0.448 0.526 0.025
Household  characteristics
Number of people in the household -0.007 [0.194] 0.006 [0.301] 0.001 [0.328] 5.087
Received remittances (d) -0.057 [0.141] 0.067* [0.081] -0.010 [0.249] 0.137
Received PROCAMPO transfers (d) -0.034 [0.263] 0.015 [0.617] 0.019** [0.048] 0.350
Personal  characteristics
Speak indigenous language (d) -0.006 [0.883] 0.031 [0.431] -0.025*** [0.003] 0.221
Worked as salaried worker (d) -0.078*** [0.006] 0.071** [0.012] 0.006 [0.416] 0.580
Age  (years) -0.007 [0.335] 0.006 [0.345] 0.000 [0.973] 52.012
Age squared/100 0.004 [0.545] -0.004 [0.549] 0.000 [0.996] 28.993
Primary - (d) -0.006 [0.864] 0.015 [0.668] -0.009 [0.391] 0.564
Secondary - (d) 0.040 [0.457] -0.029 [0.577] -0.010 [0.342] 0.126
More than secondary - (d) 0.038 [0.563] -0.038 [0.558] 0.000 [0.996] 0.073
Business characteristics
Certified or genetically improved seeds (d) 0.027 [0.524] -0.051 [0.209] 0.025* [0.095] 0.151
Livestock production  (d) -0.034 [0.295] 0.058* [0.078] -0.023** [0.016] 0.424
Agricultural or livestock subproducts (d) 0.075** [0.014] -0.069** [0.024] -0.006 [0.456] 0.413
No workers hired in 2001 (d) -0.013 [0.645] 0.012 [0.690] 0.002 [0.843] 0.326
Sells to informal trader (coyote) (d) -0.073** [0.023] 0.079** [0.013] -0.006 [0.442] 0.241
Sells outside municipality (d) -0.124*** [0.001] 0.124*** [0.001] 0.000 [0.972] 0.151
Owns ejido/communal land (d) -0.025 [0.410] 0.021 [0.482] 0.004 [0.640] 0.517
Owns irrigated land (d) -0.115*** [0.001] 0.098*** [0.005] 0.017 [0.128] 0.222
Productive assets (log) 0.010 [0.154] -0.011 [0.116] 0.001 [0.640] 9.316
Age of business (log) 0.023 [0.245] -0.028 [0.157] 0.005 [0.405] 2.920
Received training or technical assistance (d) 0.014 [0.706] -0.037 [0.305] 0.023* [0.062] 0.223
Has formal savings  (d) 0.039 [0.497] -0.063 [0.249] 0.024 [0.235] 0.078
Has informal savings - tandas  (d) -0.026 [0.658] 0.028 [0.632] -0.002 [0.890] 0.056
Made sales on credit (d) -0.126** [0.011] 0.120** [0.013] 0.005 [0.682] 0.080
Bought inputs on credit (d) -0.071 [0.141] 0.018 [0.705] 0.053** [0.019] 0.099
Registration with any govmnt - (d) -0.009 [0.831] -0.034 [0.411] 0.043** [0.024] 0.155
Member in guilds (d) -0.025 [0.612] -0.004 [0.938] 0.028 [0.111] 0.114
Regional characteristics
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) -0.023 [0.742] 0.017 [0.809] 0.006 [0.731] 0.324
Region 2: Center (d) 0.180*** [0.007] -0.178*** [0.007] -0.002 [0.878] 0.346
Region 3: Center-west (d) 0.049 [0.483] -0.072 [0.287] 0.024 [0.293] 0.200
Region 4: Northwest (d) 0.020 [0.807] -0.022 [0.786] 0.002 [0.934] 0.069
Population in municipality (log) 0.032** [0.041] -0.032** [0.041] 0.000 [0.991] 10.448
Population employed in agricultural sector in 
municipality (%)
0.341*** [0.000] -0.356*** [0.000] 0.016 [0.591] 0.310
Number of types of providers of financial 
services in locality
0.005 [0.545] -0.010 [0.233] 0.005** [0.018] 1.986
Urban area (d) -0.053 [0.326] 0.066 [0.214] -0.014 [0.108] 0.107
Demand identification
Preliminary steps to start a business - (d) -0.053* [0.067] 0.052* [0.068] 0.001 [0.458] 0.366
Death or illness - (d) -0.045 [0.362] 0.044 [0.358] 0.001 [0.596] 0.088
Loss of income - (d) 0.020 [0.655] -0.019 [0.657] -0.001 [0.635] 0.134
Purchased house with own resources (d) -0.022 [0.438] 0.021 [0.440] 0.001 [0.549] 0.645
Inherited a business (farm) (d) -0.034 [0.246] 0.033 [0.243] 0.001 [0.539] 0.600
Present economic situation of the family is bett 0.043 [0.217] -0.042 [0.222] -0.001 [0.414] 0.212
Did not purchase asset b/c of no need - (d) 0.008 [0.809] -0.007 [0.809] 0.000 [0.821] 0.252
Plans to make improvements in business - (d) -0.086*** [0.004] 0.083*** [0.004] 0.002 [0.444] 0.331
Affected by climatic events (d) -0.103*** [0.000] 0.100*** [0.001] 0.003 [0.415] 0.352
Robust p values in brackets.
Number of observations: 1,558.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
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Table 6d:  Farmers—partial derivatives of participation outcomes in informal loan markets
(derived from Heckman probit estimates) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability 0.486 0.447 0.067
Household  characteristics
Number of people in the household -0.010* [0.066] 0.011** [0.045] -0.001 [0.667] 5.087
Received remittances (d) -0.088** [0.021] 0.095** [0.015] -0.006 [0.748] 0.137
Received PROCAMPO transfers (d) 0.017 [0.585] -0.021 [0.479] 0.004 [0.783] 0.350
Personal  characteristics
Speak indigenous language (d) -0.033 [0.411] 0.021 [0.603] 0.012 [0.572] 0.221
Worked as salaried worker (d) -0.083*** [0.004] 0.037 [0.183] 0.046*** [0.001] 0.580
Age  (years) -0.009 [0.216] 0.007 [0.297] 0.001 [0.675] 52.012
Age squared/100 0.006 [0.361] -0.003 [0.658] -0.003 [0.358] 28.993
Primary - (d) -0.033 [0.338] 0.067** [0.045] -0.034* [0.082] 0.564
Secondary - (d) -0.035 [0.509] 0.077 [0.133] -0.042** [0.016] 0.126
More than secondary - (d) -0.007 [0.917] 0.064 [0.319] -0.057*** [0.000] 0.073
Business characteristics
Certified or genetically improved seeds (d) 0.011 [0.791] -0.041 [0.299] 0.031 [0.227] 0.151
Livestock production  (d) -0.036 [0.283] 0.044 [0.186] -0.008 [0.589] 0.424
Agricultural or livestock subproducts (d) 0.068** [0.027] -0.063** [0.041] -0.006 [0.708] 0.413
No workers hired in 2001 (d) -0.032 [0.279] 0.021 [0.469] 0.011 [0.467] 0.326
Sells to informal trader (coyote) (d) -0.116*** [0.000] 0.087*** [0.006] 0.029 [0.124] 0.241
Sells outside municipality (d) -0.108*** [0.004] 0.109*** [0.005] -0.001 [0.948] 0.151
Owns ejido/communal land (d) 0.003 [0.922] -0.005 [0.879] 0.002 [0.918] 0.517
Owns irrigated land (d) -0.066* [0.068] 0.084** [0.017] -0.018 [0.294] 0.222
Productive assets (log) 0.005 [0.466] -0.014** [0.047] 0.009** [0.021] 9.316
Age of business (log) 0.013 [0.539] -0.004 [0.849] -0.009 [0.380] 2.920
Received training or technical assistance (d) 0.006 [0.878] -0.007 [0.836] 0.002 [0.918] 0.223
Has formal savings  (d) 0.141** [0.010] -0.103* [0.057] -0.038* [0.064] 0.078
Has informal savings - tandas  (d) -0.092 [0.104] 0.057 [0.310] 0.035 [0.279] 0.056
Made sales on credit (d) -0.117** [0.021] 0.056 [0.280] 0.061* [0.082] 0.080
Bought inputs on credit (d) -0.122** [0.011] 0.047 [0.341] 0.075** [0.022] 0.099
Registration with any govmnt - (d) 0.043 [0.294] -0.052 [0.191] 0.009 [0.657] 0.155
Member in guilds (d) 0.030 [0.545] -0.030 [0.520] 0.000 [0.994] 0.114
Regional characteristics
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) -0.094 [0.178] -0.109 [0.169] 0.203*** [0.001] 0.324
Region 2: Center (d) 0.107 [0.107] -0.237*** [0.001] 0.130** [0.011] 0.346
Region 3: Center-west (d) -0.001 [0.991] -0.245*** [0.000] 0.246*** [0.000] 0.200
Region 4: Northwest (d) -0.040 [0.625] -0.204** [0.031] 0.244*** [0.007] 0.069
Population in municipality (log) 0.028* [0.083] -0.053*** [0.001] 0.025*** [0.001] 10.448
Population employed in agricultural sector in 
municipality (%)
0.370*** [0.000] -0.494*** [0.000] 0.124** [0.014] 0.310
Number of types of providers of financial 
services in locality
0.025*** [0.004] -0.016* [0.066] -0.009** [0.030] 1.986
Urban area (d) -0.108** [0.043] 0.061 [0.277] 0.047 [0.179] 0.107
Demand identification
Preliminary steps to start a business - (d) -0.084*** [0.009] 0.069*** [0.007] 0.015 [0.529] 0.366
Death or illness - (d) -0.106 [0.273] 0.086* [0.099] 0.020 [0.679] 0.088
Loss of income - (d) 0.028 [0.516] -0.023 [0.532] -0.005 [0.594] 0.134
Purchased house with own resources (d) -0.013 [0.687] 0.010 [0.703] 0.002 [0.652] 0.645
Inherited a business (farm) (d) -0.041 [0.186] 0.034 [0.270] 0.007 [0.418] 0.600
Present economic situation of the family is bett 0.048 [0.213] -0.039 [0.162] -0.008 [0.578] 0.212
Did not purchase asset b/c of no need - (d) 0.031 [0.364] -0.025 [0.330] -0.005 [0.616] 0.252
Plans to make improvements in business - (d) -0.068 [0.201] 0.055 [0.340] 0.012 [0.232] 0.331
Affected by climatic events (d) -0.121*** [0.007] 0.099 [0.120] 0.022 [0.383] 0.352
Robust p values in brackets.
Number of observations: 1,558.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
Region 5 is the omitted category in this regression.
Mean 





Table 6e: Enterprises—partial derivatives of participation outcomes in formal loan markets
(derived from Heckman probit estimates) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability 0.496 0.237 0.267
Personal characteristics
% of share capital belonging to majority  0.000 [0.951] 0.001 [0.142] -0.001 [0.202] 58.395
Foreign ownership present - (d) 0.032 [0.482] 0.069 [0.110] -0.101** [0.026] 0.098
Male is responsible for company - (d) -0.047 [0.319] 0.005 [0.900] 0.041 [0.339] 0.926
Secondary education (d) 0.087 [0.209] -0.035 [0.541] -0.052 [0.408] 0.066
Vocational education (d) 0.066 [0.330] 0.004 [0.950] -0.070 [0.265] 0.087
College educaiton (d) 0.100* [0.091] -0.031 [0.514] -0.068 [0.215] 0.774
Business characteristics
Average of Log assets in 2000-01 -0.005 [0.591] -0.032*** [0.000] 0.037*** [0.000] 16.878
Large (d) -0.010 [0.862] 0.010 [0.851] 0.000 [0.999] 0.255
Medium (d) -0.002 [0.970] 0.006 [0.909] -0.004 [0.942] 0.504
Small (d) -0.060 [0.291] 0.024 [0.644] 0.035 [0.519] 0.154
Age of business is 7 to 10 years (d) 0.018 [0.668] -0.027 [0.496] 0.008 [0.838] 0.166
Age of business is 11 to 15 years (d) 0.035 [0.411] -0.086** [0.031] 0.051 [0.215] 0.169
Age of business is 16 to 25 years (d) 0.002 [0.952] -0.024 [0.499] 0.022 [0.554] 0.254
Age of business is over  25 years (d) -0.018 [0.663] -0.045 [0.224] 0.064 [0.111] 0.230
Company is part of economic group  (d) 0.039 [0.210] -0.044 [0.105] 0.005 [0.859] 0.313
Exports - (d) -0.074** [0.015] 0.029 [0.281] 0.045 [0.124] 0.411
Main shareholder is responsible (d)  -0.070** [0.013] -0.020 [0.421] 0.091*** [0.001] 0.413
Sold on credit - (d) -0.036 [0.282] -0.036 [0.267] 0.072** [0.032] 0.717
Buying on credit - (d) -0.106*** [0.005] 0.024 [0.510] 0.082** [0.023] 0.810
Formal savings - (d) -0.008 [0.858] -0.084* [0.082] 0.092** [0.035] 0.897
External auditor of financial statements - (d) 0.005 [0.913] -0.012 [0.749] 0.007 [0.846] 0.800
Registered with government - (d) 0.162*** [0.008] 0.048 [0.405] -0.210*** [0.001] 0.933
Training of personnel in 2000 or 2001 - (d) 0.030 [0.366] -0.041 [0.165] 0.011 [0.713] 0.721
Registered with private - (d) 0.003 [0.918] 0.004 [0.888] -0.008 [0.804] 0.775
Personnel received training in finance - (d) 0.021 [0.579] -0.030 [0.408] 0.009 [0.825] 0.141
Internet used in 2001 - (d) -0.047 [0.186] -0.027 [0.424] 0.073** [0.023] 0.714
Acquired new technology in 2001 - (d) -0.010 [0.730] -0.023 [0.363] 0.033 [0.231] 0.309
Location and activity
Agro business - (d) -0.126*** [0.009] -0.028 [0.504] 0.154*** [0.001] 0.483
Manufacturing - (d) -0.031 [0.451] -0.026 [0.492] 0.057 [0.157] 0.267
Percentage employed in agriculture (census  0.002** [0.034] -0.002* [0.058] 0.000 [0.646] 31.502
Population in state (log)  0.004 [0.801] -0.007 [0.665] 0.002 [0.882] 14.979
Region 1: South & Southeast -0.127** [0.010] 0.198*** [0.000] -0.071 [0.134] 0.153
Region 2: Center 0.050 [0.209] 0.042 [0.242] -0.092** [0.020] 0.344
Region 3: Center-west -0.004 [0.921] 0.031 [0.424] -0.027 [0.512] 0.216
Region 4: Northwest 0.030 [0.536] 0.059 [0.176] -0.089* [0.056] 0.130
Urban area - (d) 0.080* [0.078] 0.021 [0.591] -0.101** [0.027] 0.328
Demand identification
Problem: reduction in internal resources in 
2001 - (d)
-0.031 [0.333] 0.002 [0.741] 0.029 [0.292] 0.251
Problem: selling prices very low - (d) -0.104*** [0.003] 0.007 [0.674] 0.098*** [0.004] 0.157
No problem to commercialize - (d) 0.062* [0.052] -0.004 [0.696] -0.058** [0.032] 0.242
Problem: delay in credit payments to clients in 
2001 - (d)
-0.003 [0.920] 0.000 [0.925] 0.003 [0.920] 0.178
Finance came from own resources - (d) 0.125*** [0.001] -0.008 [0.651] -0.117*** [0.008] 0.864
Plans to make improvements in business - (d) -0.063** [0.020] 0.005 [0.633] 0.058** [0.032] 0.768
Robust p values in brackets.
Number of observations: 1,707.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
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Table 6f:  Enterprises—partial derivatives of participation outcomes in informal loan markets
(derived from Heckman probit estimates) 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability 0.599 0.263 0.137
Personal  characteristics
% of share capital belonging to majority 0.000 [0.277] -0.001* [0.077] 0.000 [0.382] 58.395
Foreign ownership present - (d) -0.051 [0.257] -0.012 [0.775] 0.058* [0.072] 0.098
Male is responsible for company - (d) -0.030 [0.520] 0.019 [0.658] 0.011 [0.750] 0.926
Secondary education (d) 0.076 [0.260] -0.042 [0.475] -0.034 [0.385] 0.066
Vocational education (d) 0.172** [0.010] -0.122** [0.037] -0.050 [0.231] 0.087
College educaiton (d) 0.122** [0.033] -0.048 [0.341] -0.074** [0.026] 0.774
Business characteristics
Average of Log assets in 2000-01 -0.004 [0.624] 0.011 [0.188] -0.007 [0.276] 16.878
Large (d) -0.009 [0.876] -0.056 [0.292] 0.063 [0.125] 0.255
Medium (d) -0.002 [0.965] -0.055 [0.248] 0.058 [0.104] 0.504
Small (d) -0.060 [0.263] -0.021 [0.682] 0.074* [0.052] 0.154
Age of business is 7 to 10 years (d) 0.046 [0.282] -0.080** [0.026] 0.037 [0.225] 0.166
Age of business is 11 to 15 years (d) 0.019 [0.652] -0.040 [0.285] 0.021 [0.487] 0.169
Age of business is 16 to 25 years (d) -0.026 [0.503] 0.000 [0.993] 0.025 [0.372] 0.254
Age of business is over  25 years (d) -0.059 [0.148] -0.005 [0.889] 0.060** [0.037] 0.230
Company is part of economic group  (d) 0.012 [0.695] -0.074** [0.010] 0.061*** [0.006] 0.313
Exports - (d) -0.096*** [0.002] 0.039 [0.146] 0.057*** [0.009] 0.411
Main shareholder is responsible (d)  -0.019 [0.504] 0.032 [0.215] -0.013 [0.502] 0.413
Sold on credit - (d) -0.001 [0.980] 0.004 [0.906] -0.003 [0.899] 0.717
Buying on credit - (d) -0.084** [0.028] 0.023 [0.459] 0.066** [0.022] 0.810
Formal savings - (d) -0.045 [0.307] -0.009 [0.815] 0.054** [0.031] 0.897
External auditor of financial statements - (d) 0.109** [0.010] -0.027 [0.492] -0.082*** [0.003] 0.800
Registered with government - (d) 0.135** [0.027] -0.063 [0.265] -0.072 [0.134] 0.933
Training of personnel in 2000 or 2001 - (d) 0.057* [0.067] -0.037 [0.203] -0.020 [0.338] 0.721
Registered with private - (d) -0.054* [0.093] 0.011 [0.712] 0.043** [0.039] 0.775
Personnel received training in finance - (d) 0.047 [0.213] -0.015 [0.682] -0.032 [0.250] 0.141
Internet used in 2001 - (d) -0.044 [0.204] 0.038 [0.238] 0.006 [0.816] 0.714
Acquired new technology in 2001 - (d) 0.011 [0.691] -0.010 [0.716] -0.002 [0.924] 0.309
Location and Activity
Agro business - (d) -0.015 [0.749] 0.041 [0.335] -0.026 [0.416] 0.483
Manufacturing - (d) 0.009 [0.818] 0.006 [0.872] -0.015 [0.597] 0.267
Percentage employed in agriculture (census  0.001 [0.177] -0.002* [0.059] 0.000 [0.506] 31.502
Population in state (log)  -0.017 [0.311] 0.005 [0.773] 0.013 [0.278] 14.979
Region 1: South & Southeast -0.122** [0.012] 0.041 [0.398] 0.074** [0.036] 0.153
Region 2: Center 0.051 [0.201] -0.122*** [0.001] 0.073** [0.014] 0.344
Region 3: Center-west 0.057 [0.173] -0.134*** [0.000] 0.082*** [0.008] 0.216
Region 4: Northwest -0.020 [0.673] -0.136*** [0.000] 0.144*** [0.000] 0.130
Urban area - (d) 0.077* [0.076] -0.059 [0.130] -0.017 [0.544] 0.328
Demand identification
Problem: reduction in internal resources in 
2001 - (d)
-0.098*** [0.001] 0.079*** [0.001] 0.021 [0.104] 0.251
Problem: selling prices very low - (d) -0.098*** [0.008] 0.080** [0.011] 0.021 [0.111] 0.157
No problem to commercialize - (d) 0.029 [0.365] -0.022 [0.369] -0.006 [0.388] 0.242
Problem: delay in credit payments to clients in 
2001 - (d)
-0.014 [0.678] 0.011 [0.675] 0.003 [0.698] 0.178
Finance came from own resources - (d) 0.081** [0.027] -0.066** [0.034] -0.017 [0.140] 0.864
Plans to make improvements in business - (d) -0.043 [0.159] 0.034 [0.185] 0.009 [0.153] 0.768
Robust p values in brackets.
Number of observations: 1,707.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
Region 5 is the omitted category in this regression.
Mean 






Table 7a: Incidence of investment incidence and loan market participation categories











No. Obs. % % % % %
Individual entrepreneurs (past 3 years)
Microentrepreneurs 3300 37.0 30.8 36.7 51.8 56.5
Farmers 1825 27.3 23.4 25.7 37.0 46.2
Enterprises (past 2 years)
Nonagricultural enterprises 1073 77.6 73.7 72.1 90.6 81.2
Agricultural enterprises 954 79.9 79.8 71.1 88.3 75.2
Microentrepreneurs 1211 10.2 10.1 8.7 12.8 14.1
Farmers 490 12.6 12.1 11.4 18.7 17.2
Nonagricultural enterprises 776 17.5 17.8 18.8 15.1 22.0
Agricultural enterprises 714 14.9 14.8 12.6 15.2 16.9
Purchased agric. land in past 5 years
All farmers 1825 4.4 3.2 4.8 7.4 6.9
Farmers with owned land 1413 4.8 3.4 5.1 7.1 8.9
Purchased agric. land in past 5 years
Farmers with owned land 1413 48.3 50.6 27.2 49.9 81.3
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the 2002 Household and Enterprise surveys.
All
Panel C. Investment in agricultural land (% of column headings)
Panel A. Investment in fixed assets (% of column headings)
Panel D.  Amounts invested in land to value of land—median values (%)





Table 7b:  Incidence of investment and I/K ratio across Mexican regions








Individual entrepreneurs (past 3 years)
Microentrepreneurs 37.0 42.4 25.9 44.9 34.2 38.9
Farmers 27.3 45.4 10.5 26.3 30.1 20.9
Enterprises (past 2 years)
Nonagricultural enterprises 77.6 70.2 78.8 86.4 65.8 78.1
Agricultural enterprises 79.9 75.5 76.1 88.4 75.8 84.3
Microentrepreneurs 10.2 9.8 11.2 12.2 11.2 7.9
Farmers 12.6 13.3 7.0 14.7 16.0 13.8
Nonagricultural enterprises 17.5 15.7 18.5 18.5 12.7 16.6
Agricultural enterprises 14.9 13.5 12.6 16.7 16.3 18.1
Purchased agric. land in past 5 years
All farmers 4.4 4.7 2.8 6.5 3.5 5.4
Farmers with owned land 4.8 5.1 3.0 7.1 6.4 6.5
Purchased agric. land in past 5 years
Farmers with owned land 48.3 63.0 13.8 25.4 62.3 31.0
Source:  Authors' calculations based on data from the 2002 Household and Enterprise surveys.
Panel A. Investment in fixed assets (% of column headings)
Panel B. Amounts invested to fixed assets—median values (%)
Panel C. Investment in agricultural land (% of column headings)






Table 8a:  Microentrepreneurs—assets investment, regressions
(partial derivatives, probit and tobit estimates)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability (probit) 0.382 0.382491
Predicted I/K ratio if I/K > 0 (tobit) 0.357 0.357455
Growth opportunities
Productive assets (log) 0.022 *** [0.001] 0.022 *** [0.001] -0.006 *** [0.004] -0.006 *** [0.005] 9.5959
No workers hired in 2001 (d) -0.107 *** [0.000] -0.106 *** [0.000] -0.038 *** [0.000] -0.038 *** [0.000] 0.6133
Ratio of total productive equipment to owned equipment -0.034  [0.102] -0.034 [0.105] 0.005 [0.529] 0.005  [0.511] 1.1542
Age of business (log) -0.032 *** [0.003] -0.031 *** [0.004] -0.011 *** [0.004] -0.011 *** [0.004] 1.9749
Expectations
Present economic situation of the family is better 0.098 *** [0.000] 0.097 *** [0.000] 0.023 *** [0.003] 0.023 *** [0.003] 0.3052
Plans to make improvements in business 0.050 ** [0.015] 0.049 ** [0.018] 0.015 ** [0.038] 0.015 ** [0.047] 0.4729
Age of entrepreneurs (log) -0.134 *** [0.000] -0.138 *** [0.000] -0.053 *** [0.000] -0.054 *** [0.000] 3.7390
Entrepreneurial ability
Worked as salaried worker (d) 0.042 * [0.062] 0.043 * [0.053] 0.018 ** [0.026] 0.018 ** [0.022] 0.6555
Has worked in the United States (d) 0.020  [0.518] 0.021 [0.515] 0.020 * [0.078] 0.020 * [0.078] 0.1237
Preliminary steps (d) 0.044 ** [0.034] 0.045 ** [0.032] 0.015 ** [0.040] 0.016 ** [0.036] 0.5180
Owner/worker received training (d) 0.148 *** [0.000] 0.148 *** [0.000] 0.044 *** [0.005] 0.044 *** [0.005] 0.0680
Availability of funds
Number of personal items 0.004  [0.110] 0.004 [0.124] 0.002 ** [0.021] 0.002 ** [0.028] 10.2408
Any remittances (d) 0.074 ** [0.020] 0.075 ** [0.019] 0.012 [0.279] 0.013  [0.246] 0.1153
Finance
Has formal savings  (d) -0.004  [0.898] -0.016 [0.633] 0.007 [0.570] 0.003  [0.782] 0.1211
Has informal savings  (d) 0.072 *** [0.002] 0.072 *** [0.002] 0.027 *** [0.001] 0.027 *** [0.001] 0.2888
Has received any loans 0.118 *** [0.000] 0.036 *** [0.002] 0.1433
Receive formal loans (d) 0.041  [0.376] 0.010 [0.546] 0.0524
Receive informal loans (d) 0.159 *** [0.000] 0.050 *** [0.000] 0.0909
Credit constrained  (d) 0.030  [0.171] 0.030 [0.172] 0.010 [0.214] 0.010  [0.216] 0.3710
Locality characteristics
Population employed in agricultural sector in  0.003 *** [0.000] 0.003 *** [0.000] 0.001 ** [0.012] 0.001 ** [0.010] 23.5021
Population in municipality (log)  0.011  [0.274] 0.010 [0.301] 0.007 ** [0.043] 0.007 * [0.051] 10.5641
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) 0.066 * [0.082] 0.069 * [0.069] 0.019 [0.189] 0.020  [0.168] 0.2957
Region 2: Center (d) -0.117 *** [0.001] -0.112 *** [0.002] -0.022 * [0.095] -0.021  [0.121] 0.2892
Region 3: Center-west (d) 0.006   [0.880] 0.005 [0.898] 0.006 [0.685] 0.005   [0.705] 0.1961
Region 4: Northwest (d) -0.076 * [0.070] -0.072 * [0.086] -0.018 [0.237] -0.016  [0.282] 0.1182
Economic sector
Trade (d) -0.181 *** [0.000] -0.179 *** [0.000] -0.043 *** [0.000] -0.042 *** [0.000] 0.3590
Services (d) 0.025  [0.428] 0.028 [0.372] 0.005 [0.632] 0.007  [0.549] 0.1670
Construction (d) 0.149 *** [0.000] 0.151 *** [0.000] 0.019 [0.135] 0.020   [0.116] 0.1291
Transportation and communication (d) -0.053  [0.237] -0.053 [0.231] 0.033 * [0.060] 0.032 * [0.062] 0.0618
Observations 2749 2749 2744 2744
Wald chi2 (probits), LR chi2 (tobits) 429.71 426.27 320.60 316.57
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.1321 0.088 0.0865
SE 0.542 0.542445
Robust p values in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables the partial derivatives represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
Region 5 is the omitted category in this regression.
Probit - purchase of assets Tobit - Value of investment/Value of assets Mean 
values of Xs
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
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Table 8b:  Farmers—assets and land investment
(partial derivatives, probit estimates)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability (probit)  0.221776 0.221853 0.03213 0.032322
Predicted I/K ratio if I/K > 0 (tobit)
Growth opportunities
Value of owned land (log) 0.005 * [0.069] 0.005 * [0.067]
Value of productive assets 0.013 ** [0.040] 0.013 ** [0.040]
No workers hired in 2001(d) 0.051 * [0.055] 0.051 * [0.055] -0.018 * [0.083] -0.017 * [0.094]
Ratio of areas: used to owned land 0.021 [0.344] 0.021 [0.339] 0.010 [0.121] 0.010 [0.130]
Age of business (log) 0.045 ** [0.030] 0.045 ** [0.030] -0.012 * [0.079] -0.012 * [0.083]
Irrigation (d) -0.010 [0.742] -0.009 [0.752] 0.016 [0.176] 0.016 [0.194]
Expectations
Present economic situation of the family is better 0.097 *** [0.001] 0.098 *** [0.001] 0.023 * [0.077] 0.023 * [0.083]
Plans to make improvements in business 0.021 [0.472] 0.021 [0.468] 0.020 * [0.068] 0.020 * [0.062]
Age of entrepreneur (log) -0.146 *** [0.006] -0.145 *** [0.007] 0.008 [0.674] 0.006 [0.752]
Entrepreneurial ability
Worked as salaried worker (d) 0.050 * [0.059] 0.049 * [0.060] 0.015 [0.163] 0.016 [0.150]
Has worked in the United States 0.045 [0.275] 0.044 [0.279] 0.005 [0.714] 0.005 [0.743]
Preliminary steps (d) -0.018 [0.513] -0.018 [0.512] 0.000 [0.997] 0.000 [0.997]
Received training (d) 0.043 [0.263] 0.044 [0.254] -0.003 [0.848] -0.004 [0.767]
inherited the farm (d) -0.042 [0.132] -0.042 [0.133] -0.004 [0.710] -0.004 [0.695]
Availability of funds
Received PROCAMPO transfers (d) 0.051 * [0.050] 0.051 ** [0.048] 0.004 [0.730] 0.003 [0.780]
Received remittances (d) 0.000 [0.998] 0.000 [0.996] 0.004 [0.810] 0.004 [0.812]
Finance
Has formal savings  (d) 0.175 *** [0.002] 0.177 *** [0.002] 0.109 *** [0.000] 0.105 *** [0.000]
Has informal savings  (d) 0.068 [0.101] 0.067 [0.103] 0.033 ** [0.042] 0.034 ** [0.038]
Has received any loans (d) 0.075 * [0.065] 0.007 [0.621]
Receive formal loans (d) 0.088 [0.155] -0.007 [0.697]
Receive informal loans (d) 0.067 [0.151] 0.018 [0.316]
Credit constrained  (d) 0.000 [0.993] 0.000 [0.993] 0.010 [0.371] 0.010 [0.379]
Locality characteristics
Population employed in agricultural sector in  0.002 *** [0.009] 0.002 *** [0.009] 0.001 ** [0.044] 0.001 ** [0.037]
Population in municipality (log)  -0.009 [0.460] -0.010 [0.456] 0.000 [0.967] 0.000 [0.988]
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) 0.360 *** [0.000] 0.359 *** [0.000] 0.007 [0.759] 0.007 [0.747]
Region 2: Center (d) -0.005 [0.934] -0.006 [0.924] -0.004 [0.841] -0.004 [0.845]
Region 3: Center-west (d) 0.100 [0.122] 0.099 [0.124] -0.009 [0.656] -0.009 [0.654]
Region 4: Northwest (d) 0.076 [0.428] 0.076 [0.422] -0.022 [0.290] -0.023 [0.260]
Economic sector
activity==Livestock-Agro -0.046 [0.445] -0.046 [0.446] -0.006 [0.778] -0.006 [0.783]
activity==Forestry-Agro -0.041 [0.601] -0.041 [0.598] 0.060 [0.112] 0.062 [0.103]
Observations 1311 1311 1112 1112
Wald chi2 (probits), LR chi2 (tobits) 247.93 248.05 99.99 97
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1811 0.181 0.1734 0.1714
Robust p values in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables the partial derivatives represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.










Table 8c: Farmers—assets and land investment
(partial derivatives, tobit estimates)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Predicted probability (probit) 
Predicted I/K ratio if I/K > 0 (tobit) 0.293549 0.293755 0.657133 0.658441
Growth opportunities
Value of owned land (log) 0.006 [0.375] 0.007  [0.371] 10.4116
Value of productive assets -0.003   [0.209] -0.003 [0.219] 9.183
No workers hired in 2001(d) 0.010   [0.316] 0.010 [0.303] -0.054 [0.107] -0.053   [0.116] 0.3135
Ratio of areas: used to owned land 0.015 * [0.073] 0.015 * [0.078] 0.021 [0.340] 0.020  [0.365] 1.0927
Age of business (log) 0.015 * [0.057] 0.015 * [0.055] -0.034 * [0.085] -0.034 * [0.088] 3.0743
Irrigation  (d) 0.003  [0.754] 0.003 [0.777] 0.032 [0.332] 0.030  [0.359] 0.2715
Expectations
Present economic situation of the family is better 0.033 *** [0.006] 0.032 *** [0.007] 0.065 * [0.053] 0.065 * [0.058] 0.2105
Plans to make improvements in business 0.010   [0.311] 0.010 [0.313] 0.042 [0.196] 0.044   [0.177] 0.3272
Age of entrepreneur (log) -0.048 ** [0.015] -0.049 ** [0.012] 0.007 [0.901] 0.002  [0.966] 3.977
Entrepreneurial ability
Worked as salaried worker (d) 0.022 ** [0.022] 0.023 ** [0.021] 0.034 [0.284] 0.035  [0.271] 0.5599
Has worked in the United States 0.019   [0.230] 0.019 [0.226] 0.009 [0.842] 0.008   [0.858] 0.1342
Preliminary  steps  (d) 0.006  [0.540] 0.006 [0.530] -0.006 [0.838] -0.006  [0.847] 0.3356
Received training (d) 0.014  [0.331] 0.013 [0.352] 0.007 [0.848] 0.004  [0.917] 0.1442
inherited the farm (d) -0.004   [0.681] -0.004 [0.681] -0.013 [0.669] -0.013   [0.664] 0.656
Availability of funds
Received PROCAMPO transfers (d) 0.006  [0.502] 0.006 [0.527] -0.002 [0.948] -0.004  [0.904] 0.4272
Received remittances (d) -0.003  [0.796] -0.003 [0.802] 0.017 [0.674] 0.017  [0.675] 0.1449
Finance
Has formal savings  (d) 0.066 *** [0.003] 0.065 *** [0.003] 0.158 *** [0.007] 0.153 *** [0.009] 0.0763
Has informal savings  (d) 0.014  [0.356] 0.014 [0.343] 0.079 * [0.052] 0.081 ** [0.048] 0.1083
Has received any loans (d) 0.024 [0.107] 0.015  [0.725] 0.1381
Receive formal loans (d) 0.016  [0.464] -0.017 [0.765] 0.0557
Receive informal loans (d) 0.030  [0.103] 0.037 [0.482] 0.0824
Credit constrained  (d) -0.001   [0.935] -0.001 [0.933] 0.016 [0.635] 0.016   [0.641] 0.4272
Locality characteristics
Population employed in agricultural sector in  0.001 *** [0.004] 0.001 *** [0.003] 0.001 [0.105] 0.001 * [0.092] 32.4921
Population in municipality (log)  0.000  [0.998] 0.000 [0.992] 0.001 [0.970] 0.001  [0.960] 10.2803
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) 0.080 *** [0.002] 0.081 *** [0.002] 0.010 [0.875] 0.010  [0.876] 0.3326
Region 2: Center (d) -0.029  [0.194] -0.028 [0.201] -0.023 [0.728] -0.023  [0.725] 0.4043
Region 3: Center-west (d) 0.013  [0.569] 0.014 [0.563] -0.034 [0.571] -0.035  [0.561] 0.1693
Region 4: Northwest (d) 0.002  [0.959] 0.001 [0.975] -0.045 [0.572] -0.050  [0.524] 0.0328
Economic sector
activity==Livestock-Agro -0.017  [0.422] -0.017 [0.418] -0.004 [0.944] -0.004  [0.952] 0.0458
activity==Forestry-Agro 0.005  [0.867] 0.005 [0.863] 0.111 [0.198] 0.113  [0.192] 0.0236
Observations 1225 1225 1111 1111
Wald chi2 (probits), LR chi2 (tobits) 211.89 211.58 62.12 61.5
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002
Pseudo R2 0.1555 0.1553 0.1135 0.1124
Robust p values in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables the partial derivatives represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
Region 5 is the omitted category in this regression.
Model 1
Value of investment/value of assets Mean 
values of 
Xs Model 2
Value of land purchases/land value
Model 1





Table 9a. Enterprises—assets investment








Predicted probability (probit) 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.849
Enterprise characteristics
Value investment/value assets (2000) 0.382*** [0.000] 0.383*** [0.000] 0.384*** [0.000] 0.384*** [0.000] 0.408*** [0.000]
Sales growth (2001-2000) 0.133*** [0.000] 0.134*** [0.000] 0.134*** [0.000] 0.135*** [0.000] 0.134*** [0.000]
Total productive assets (log) 0.052*** [0.000] 0.052*** [0.000] 0.052*** [0.000] 0.052*** [0.000] 0.054*** [0.000]
Cash flow/total assets (2000) -0.021 [0.515]
Manufacturing (d) 0.011 [0.692] 0.011 [0.683] 0.011 [0.670] 0.012 [0.643] 0.007 [0.791]
Agriculture (d) 0.005 [0.834] 0.006 [0.815] -0.004 [0.879] -0.004 [0.885] -0.012 [0.638]
Finance indicators
Receive any loan (d) 0.059*** [0.005] 0.046 [0.125]
Receive formal loans (d) 0.064*** [0.006] 0.055 [0.115]
Receive informal loans (d) 0.041 [0.184] 0.026 [0.562]
Credit constrained (d) 0.042 [0.194] 0.042 [0.190] 0.038 [0.247] 0.038 [0.247] 0.018 [0.586]
Agriculture (d) * Receive any loan (d) 0.026 [0.542]
Agriculture (d) * Receive formal loans  0.020 [0.693]
Agriculture (d) * Receive informal loans  0.034 [0.586]
Agriculture (d)* Credit constrained (d) -0.030 [0.530] -0.031 [0.525] -0.019 [0.697] -0.019 [0.701] -0.027 [0.569]
Agriculture (d) * Cash flow  0.076* [0.071]
Regional characteristics
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) -0.033 [0.316] -0.035 [0.297] -0.034 [0.309] -0.035 [0.298] -0.037 [0.275]
Region 2: Center (d) -0.051* [0.085] -0.052* [0.079] -0.051* [0.084] -0.052* [0.077] -0.052* [0.081]
Region 3: Center-west (d) 0.068** [0.029] 0.067** [0.032] 0.067** [0.032] 0.066** [0.036] 0.064** [0.042]
Region 4: Northwest (d) 0.004 [0.916] 0.001 [0.977] 0.002 [0.964] 0.000 [0.994] 0.006 [0.868]
Observations 1625 1625 1625 1625 1606
Wald chi2 (probits), LR chi2 (tobits) 202.470 201.820 203.580 201.620 200.920
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
r2: 0.213 0.212 0.213 0.213 0.213
Robust p values in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables the partial derivatives represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
Region 5 is the omitted category in this regression.




Table 9b. Enterprises—assets investment







Predicted  I/K ratio if I/K > 0 (tobit) 0.282 0.282 0.282 0.282 0.279
Enterprise characteristics
Value investment / Value assets (2000) 0.245*** [0.000] 0.245*** [0.000] 0.245*** [0.000] 0.245*** [0.000] 0.244*** [0.000] 0.202
Sales-growth (2001-2000) 0.091*** [0.000] 0.091*** [0.000] 0.092*** [0.000] 0.091*** [0.000] 0.088*** [0.000] -0.025
Total productive assets (log) 0.004** [0.013] 0.004** [0.014] 0.004*** [0.009] 0.004** [0.010] 0.005*** [0.003] 16.802
Cash flow/total assets (2000) -0.004 [0.771] 0.000
Manufacturing (d) -0.029*** [0.002] -0.029*** [0.002] -0.028*** [0.004] -0.028*** [0.005] -0.030*** [0.002] 0.256
Agriculture (d) -0.017* [0.075] -0.017* [0.071] -0.029** [0.014] -0.029** [0.014] -0.027*** [0.008] 0.483
Finance indicators
Receive any loan (d) 0.025*** [0.003] 0.011 [0.321] 0.368
Receive formal loans (d) 0.023** [0.010] 0.012 [0.361] 0.268
Receive informal loans (d) 0.029** [0.031] 0.010 [0.570] 0.100
Credit constrained (d) 0.029** [0.046] 0.029** [0.047] 0.023 [0.113] 0.023 [0.115] 0.018 [0.196] 0.182
Agriculture (d)* Credit constrained (d) -0.025 [0.143] -0.025 [0.145] -0.013 [0.494] -0.013 [0.493] -0.027 [0.106] 0.094
Agriculture (d) * Receive any loan (d) 0.028 [0.103] 0.198
Agriculture (d) * Receive formal loans  0.023 [0.208] 0.150
Agriculture (d) * Receive informal loans  0.043 [0.132] 0.048
Agriculture (d) * Cash flow  0.038** [0.026] 0.108
Regional characteristics
Region 1: South & Southeast (d) -0.011 [0.380] -0.010 [0.396] -0.011 [0.377] -0.010 [0.409] -0.010 [0.404] 0.160
Region 2: Center (d) -0.005 [0.667] -0.004 [0.685] -0.005 [0.630] -0.005 [0.645] -0.004 [0.718] 0.329
Region 3: Center-west (d) 0.023* [0.057] 0.023* [0.056] 0.022* [0.070] 0.022* [0.067] 0.023* [0.055] 0.218
Region 4: Northwest (d) 0.008 [0.554] 0.009 [0.521] 0.006 [0.663] 0.007 [0.582] 0.009 [0.483] 0.132
Robust p values in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(d): dummy variables.
Note: In the case of dummy variables the partial derivatives represents the discrete change from 0 to 1.
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (2)/(1) -1 (3)/(1) -1 (4)/(1) -1
Microentrepreneurs
Purchase assets 38.5 42.6 54.5 50.4 10.7 41.6 30.9
I/K: assets 35.9 36.9 41.0 39.5 2.8 14.3 10.2
Farmers
Purchase assets 21.2 29.9 27.9 28.7 40.9 31.5 35.2
Purchase land 3.7 3.0 5.8 4.5 -20.2 56.2 21.8
I/K: assets 29.0 30.5 31.9 31.4 5.3 10.1 8.3
Nonagricultural enterprises
   Purcharse assets
       Model 1 86.1 91.6 89.9 n.a. 6.4 4.4 n.a.
       Model 2 86.3 n.a. n.a. 90.3 n.a. n.a. 4.6
       Model 3 86.1 90.9 88.5 n.a. 5.6 2.8 n.a.
       Model 4 86.1 n.a. n.a. 90.1 n.a. n.a. 4.6
    I/K ratio
       Model 1 30.8 33.4 34.0 n.a. 8.5 10.6 n.a.
       Model 2 30.8 n.a. n.a. 33.6 n.a. n.a. 9.1
       Model 3 30.7 32.0 31.8 n.a. 4.2 3.5 n.a.
       Model 4 30.7 n.a. n.a. 32.0 n.a. n.a. 4.1
Agricultural enterprises
   Purcharse assets
       Model 1 83.7 89.9 88.0 n.a. 7.4 5.1 n.a.
       Model 2 82.3 n.a. n.a. 87.0 n.a. n.a. 5.8
       Model 3 83.8 91.1 90.0 n.a. 8.8 7.4 n.a.
       Model 4 83.8 n.a. n.a. 90.9 n.a. n.a. 8.5
    I/K ratio
       Model 1 26.5 28.7 29.2 n.a. 8.4 10.4 n.a.
       Model 2 26.5 n.a. n.a. 28.8 n.a. n.a. 8.9
       Model 3 26.5 29.8 31.5 n.a. 12.4 18.8 n.a.
       Model 4 26.5 n.a. n.a. 30.2 n.a. n.a. 13.9
n.a.:  not applicable.
Source:  Authors' calculations using regression coefficients in Tables 8a, 8b, 8c, 9a, and 9b. 
Percentage increased relative to being credit 
constrained
Predicted values
 
 
 